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Abstract
Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arith-
metic are equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic math-
ematics. The main philosophical application of reverse mathematics pro-
posed thus far is foundational analysis, which explores the limits of dif-
ferent foundations for mathematics in a formally precise manner. This
paper gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology of
foundational analysis, which have heretofore been largely left implicit in
the practice. It then shows how this account can be fruitfully applied in
the evaluation of major foundational approaches by a careful examina-
tion of two case studies: a partial realization of Hilbert’s program due to
Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended form due to Feferman
and Schu¨tte.
Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics
be proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only
ω-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as
computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some
attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate
for foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable
entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does
not preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly,
computable entailment is a Π11 complete relation, and hence employing it
commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within
any foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than Π11-CA0.
1 Introduction
In ordinary mathematical practice, mathematicians prove theorems, reasoning
from a fixed set of axioms to a logically derivable conclusion. The axioms in
play are usually implicit: mathematicians rarely assert at the beginning of their
papers that they work in, for example, PA or ZFC. Given a particular proof
we might ask which axioms were employed and thus make explicit the author’s
assumptions. Now that we have a set of axioms Γ which are sufficient to prove
some theorem ϕ, we could further inquire whether they are necessary to prove
the theorem, or whether a strictly weaker set of axioms would suffice. To a
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first approximation, reverse mathematics is the program of discovering precisely
which axioms are both necessary and sufficient to prove any given theorem of
ordinary mathematics.
Reverse mathematics was initiated by Harvey Friedman [1975, 1976], and
extensively developed in the work of Stephen Simpson and his students. It de-
termines the proof-theoretic strength of theorems of ordinary mathematics, by
proving equivalences between formalised versions of those theorems and axiom
systems in a hierarchy of known strength. Roughly speaking, the term “ordi-
nary mathematics” means non-set-theoretic mathematics, i.e. those parts of
mathematics which do not depend on abstract set-theoretical concepts. Typical
examples of ordinary mathematics include real and complex analysis, countable
algebra, and the topology of complete separable metric spaces.
The axiom systems used in reverse mathematics are subsystems of second
order arithmetic or Z2. This is an extension of familiar first order systems of
arithmetic such as Peano arithmetic. In the intended interpretation, variables in
first order arithmetic range over the natural numbers N. Second order arithmetic
also has number variables ranging over the natural numbers, but in addition to
these it has set variables which range over sets of numbers X ⊆ N. For the
full technical background on second order arithmetic the reader should consult
Simpson [2009], the primary reference work on reverse mathematics. Here we
restrict ourselves to sketching the basic features of the framework and explaining
some salient details.
The language of second order arithmetic, L2, is a two-sorted first order
language with the following nonlogical symbols: constant symbols 0 and 1,
binary function symbols + and ·, and the binary relation symbols < and ∈. L2-
structures have two domains: a first order domain |M | over which the number
variables x0, x1, . . . range, and a second order domain S ⊆ P(|M |) over which
the set variables X0, X1, . . . range. An L2-structure M is thus a tuple of the
form
(1) M = 〈|M |,SM ,+M , ·M , 0M , 1M , <M 〉,
where 0M and 1M are elements of |M |, +M and ·M are functions from |M |×|M |
to |M |, and <M is a binary relation on |M |.
The formal system Z2 of second order arithmetic has a long history in work
on foundations of mathematics, which we can trace back to Dedekind. The
most substantive classical developments are those of Hilbert and Bernays [1968,
1970]. The axioms of Z2 fall into three groups: the basic axioms; a compre-
hension scheme; and an induction axiom. The basic axioms are those of Peano
arithmetic, minus the induction scheme. To these is added the comprehension
scheme
(CA) ∃X∀n(n ∈ X ↔ ϕ(n))
for all L2-formulae ϕ (with parameters). Many subsystems of second order
arithmetic are obtained by restricting this comprehension scheme to particular
syntactically-defined subclasses. Finally there is the induction axiom
(I0) ∀X((0 ∈ X ∧ ∀n(n ∈ X → n+ 1 ∈ X))→ ∀n(n ∈ X)).
This is a single axiom rather than an axiom scheme. As such its strength is tied
directly to the associated comprehension scheme: we have induction only for
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those sets which we can prove to exist by comprehension. Because Z2 includes
the comprehension scheme for all L2-formulae ϕ, every instance of the second
order induction scheme
(I) (ϕ(0) ∧ ∀n(ϕ(n)→ ϕ(n+ 1)))→ ∀n ϕ(n)
is a theorem of Z2. By restricting ϕ to formulae in the language of first-order
arithmetic L1 we obtain the induction scheme of first-order Peano arithmetic
(PA). A stronger restriction, limiting ϕ to Σ01 formulae, gives us the Σ
0
1 induction
scheme.
A subsystem T of Z2 is a formal system in the language L2 such that each
axiom ϕ of T is a theorem of Z2. The central subsystems are colloquially known
as the Big Five. Each of them includes the basic axioms, the induction axiom
and some other set existence axioms. The weakest is RCA0, the usual base
theory for reverse mathematics. Its axioms consist of the basic axioms, ∆01
(that is, recursive) comprehension and Σ01 induction. Induction in RCA0 thus
outstrips comprehension, although it is still quite limited compared to PA or Z2.
The other members of the Big Five are: WKL0, obtained by adding to RCA0
the assertion that every infinite subtree of 2<N has an infinite path through
it; ACA0, which is given by the comprehension scheme for all arithmetically
definable sets; ATR0, which extends ACA0 with an axiom allowing the iteration
of the arithmetical operations along any wellordering; and finally Π11-CA0, whose
defining axiom is the Π11 comprehension scheme.
At first glance, second order arithmetic may seem somewhat limited, and
unsuitable for the development of large portions of mathematics, even when we
restrict our attention to ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. Formally, sec-
ond order arithmetic includes only two kinds of entities: natural numbers and
sets of natural numbers. While clever coding schemes allow objects from many
branches of mathematics to be represented within this formally austere frame-
work, limitations abound, generally to do with cardinality: one cannot quantify
over uncountable sets of real numbers, prove theorems about topological spaces
of arbitrary cardinality, and so on. Most obviously, the set R of all real numbers
cannot be directly represented.
Mathematics within second order arithmetic is thus limited to countable
or countably representable structures such as complete separable metric spaces
and countable abelian groups. Nevertheless, this turns out to include a wide
variety of mathematical objects including real numbers, continuous functions
on the real line and complex plane, and Borel and analytic sets. Constructing
representations of these objects and proving that they are well-behaved usu-
ally requires a certain minimum of theoretical strength. Definitions in reverse
mathematics are therefore often given relative to a particular system, usually
the weak base system RCA0.
While we can do enough in RCA0 to get mathematics off the ground, many
key theorems require stronger axioms. A typical example is that RCA0 does
not prove the Bolzano–Weierstraß theorem, a fundamental theorem in analysis
which states that every bounded sequence of real numbers has a convergent sub-
sequence. The Bolzano–Weierstraß theorem can be formalised as a sentence BW
in the language of second order arithmetic. In two papers which inaugurated the
study of reverse mathematics, Friedman [1975, 1976] showed that BW is equiv-
alent over RCA0 to the arithmetical comprehension scheme—the defining axiom
3
of the system ACA0. To prove the equivalence between BW and ACA0, one first
shows that ACA0 implies BW, by formalising the usual proof of the theorem
within that system. The reversal is then accomplished by adding BW to the
axioms of RCA0 and showing that any instance of arithmetical comprehension
is provable from RCA0 + BW.
One way to think about the epistemic value of reverse mathematics is that
it uncovers the resources required in ordinary mathematical reasoning: for ex-
ample, if a proof uses a compactness argument, then weak Ko¨nig’s lemma must
be amongst the stock of axioms which the mathematician draws upon, whether
explicitly or implicitly. That nonconstructive methods, in the form of compact-
ness, are required to prove the completeness theorem for first-order logic tells
us something important about that theorem and its epistemic standing. This
has many ramifications for philosophical issues. Feferman [1992] points out
the application of reverse mathematical methods to indispensability arguments.
Such arguments are intended to show that certain mathematical entities, be-
ing indispensable to science, must be accorded the same ontological rights as
those whose existence is empirically confirmed. This leaves two critical ques-
tions unanswered: which mathematical entities does this argument show us to
be committed to the existence of, and what principles concerning those entities
must we endorse in order to carry out the mathematics that is indispensable to
science? Real analysis is a natural starting point, since our current best physi-
cal theories model spacetime in terms of a geometrical continuum, as a type of
differentiable manifold. By formalising our best physical theories in second or-
der arithmetic, we could obtain far sharper answers, by showing that theorems
of analysis required for physics are equivalent to particular systems studied in
reverse mathematics.
This paper, however, is not concerned with applications of reverse mathe-
matics to the indispensability argument. Instead, it addresses the relationship of
reverse mathematics to the foundational views espoused by Hilbert and Weyl,
and the finitist and predicativist programs developed in their work and that
of their successors. More generally, it explores and defends the usefulness of
reverse mathematics for determining the limits of what can be proved within
foundational schemes that can be formalised in the setting of second order arith-
metic, and for demonstrating to adherents of particular foundational approaches
that they are unable to recover a given part of mathematics within their chosen
foundation. It then turns to the task of determining whether one component of
standard reverse mathematical practice, namely a proof-theoretically weak base
theory over which equivalences between mathematical theorems and subsystems
of second order arithmetic are proved, is essential.
§2 gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology that un-
derpin the reverse mathematical analysis of foundations. §3 and §4 are then
devoted to case studies of particular foundational programs: a partial realiza-
tion of Hilbert’s program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism as initially
developed by Weyl and then extended through the work of Kreisel, Feferman,
Schu¨tte, and others. The paper then examines a proposal of Shore [2010, 2013]
to abandon the standard practice of proving reverse mathematical equivalences
over the base theory RCA0, and instead concern ourselves only with whether
the principles involved are true in the same Turing ideals, that is to say, L2-
structures whose first order parts consist of the standard natural numbers ω and
whose second order parts are classes of sets C ⊆ P(ω) closed under Turing re-
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ducibility and recursive joins. In §5 we introduce and motivate Shore’s proposal,
and then in §6 we argue that in failing to respect the justificatory structure of
the foundational programs mentioned above, Shore’s equivalence relation shows
itself to be inappropriate for analysing foundations for mathematics in the way
described above. Finally, in §7 we show that this equivalence relation is highly
complex, and thus brings with it attendant theoretical commitments that ex-
ceed those acceptable to proponents of the type of foundational programs being
analysed.
2 Reverse mathematical analysis of foundations
One of the main philosophical roles attributed to reverse mathematics in the
current literature is what we shall call foundational analysis. This application
has been strongly promoted by Stephen Simpson, born out of his view (stated
amongst other places in Simpson [2009] and Simpson [2010]) that there is a cor-
respondence between subsystems of second order arithmetic and foundational
programs such as Weyl’s predicativism and Hilbert’s finitistic reductionism. By
providing a hierarchy of comparable systems, and proving the equivalence of the-
orems of ordinary mathematics to these systems, reverse mathematics demon-
strates what resources a particular theorem requires, and what theorems a given
system cannot prove. In other words, when committing to a foundational sys-
tem, reverse mathematics lets us know precisely what we are giving up. Cru-
cially, it also tells us when a proponent of such a system employs mathematical
resources that she is not entitled to, as they go beyond what her preferred
foundation can prove.
The following example should clarify the notion of foundational analysis.
Suppose Sarah is a predicativist in the tradition of Weyl [1918]. She believes
that the natural numbers form a completed, infinite totality, and that sets which
can be defined arithmetically—i.e. with quantifiers ranging over the natural
numbers, but not over sets of them—also exist. This would lead her to accept
the arithmetical comprehension scheme, and thus the subsystem of second order
arithmetic ACA0. She might even accept a somewhat stronger system; this
possibility is explored in §4. But given Sarah’s predicativist outlook she would
resist the thoroughly impredicative axiom scheme of Π11 comprehension, and its
associated subsystem of second order arithmetic Π11-CA0.
Now suppose that her colleague Rebecca disagrees with Sarah’s predica-
tivism and wants to persuade her that it is an inappropriate foundation for
mathematics. She might argue as follows: Since Sarah wants her predicativist
outlook to provide a foundation for all of mathematics, it would be strange if
she failed to account for important theorems of ordinary mathematics—say, in
abelian group theory. Consider the statement
(⋆) Every countable abelian group can be expressed as a direct sum of a
divisible group and a reduced group.
The group theorist in the street, Rebecca argues, believes this to be true. Sarah
might tentatively agree, whereupon Rebecca would point out the following the-
orem from reverse mathematics: assuming that (⋆) holds, one can prove (in
RCA0, which Sarah clearly accepts) the Π
1
1 comprehension scheme [Friedman,
Simpson, and Smith, 1983, theorem 6.3, p. 178].
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It appears that Sarah has some explaining to do. Either she must abandon
her predicativism, or she must push back against the naturalistic line Rebecca is
urging upon her. Neither course appears terribly palatable, while the fact that
this theorem is drawn not from set theory or some other area of mathematics
whose ontological commitments might be thought extravagant could be taken
as evidence that the problem here is a pressing one. The contentious state-
ment is an ordinary theorem from a core area of mathematics, which reverse
mathematical analysis shows us to have substantial proof-theoretic strength.
The broadly naturalistic argument that Rebecca makes to Sarah can be
generalised in a straightforward way. Let F be a foundation for mathematics
which accepts classical logic as leading to correct conclusions, and let SF be a
subsystem of second order arithmetic containing RCA0 such that the F -theorist
accepts that SF is a faithful formalisation of the principles of F . Then any
participant in the foundational dialectic may (as Rebecca does in the example
above) fill in the following schematic argument with her favourite examples, and
make it to the F -theorist:
Consider the ordinary mathematical theorem P , which may be faith-
fully formalised in the language of second order arithmetic as the sen-
tence ϕ. ϕ is equivalent over RCA0 to the subsystem of second order
arithmetic S(ϕ). But SF cannot prove the axioms of S(ϕ), and thus
cannot prove ϕ. So F cannot recover the ordinary mathematical
theorem P , and is thus inadequate as a foundation for mathematics.
It is not necessary to suppose that all instances of this argument scheme will
be persuasive to all F -theorists: foundational analysis does not provide a knock-
down argument against predicativism, or indeed any foundational view with
limited mathematical resources. Rather, it makes arguments like the dispute
between Rebecca and Sarah precise: we can see, within a common framework
(namely the base theory RCA0, and the coding required to represent ordinary
mathematical concepts in it), just where the boundaries of these foundational
systems lie. As a rational agent, Sarah surely formed her foundational views
in the full understanding that they require her to give up on any mathematics
that her view deems to be unfounded. The decision to give up on or stick with
her foundation is not one to be taken lightly, and it is one that should be made
by considering the relevant facts. These facts can, in large part, be supplied
by foundational analysis, which allows Sarah and the rest of us to see precisely
what is at stake.
For foundational analysis to play a useful philosophical role in mediating
between disputants with different foundational stances, it must be possible to
carry out this analysis on ground which is common between the disputants.1
So while a predicativist like Sarah and a platonist like Rebecca might disagree
about whether Π11 comprehension is a valid axiom, they both accept the laws
of classical logic and at least the axioms of RCA0, as well as the faithfulness
of the representation of the theorem (⋆) in second order arithmetic, and thus
both will agree that (⋆) above is not predicatively provable. In other words,
foundational analysis makes it clear where the fault lines lie, and the existence
of common ground makes the conclusion available not just to those who accept
1For a closely related discussion, albeit one which treats much stronger logics and axiomatic
principles than those which are the subject of this article, see Koellner [2010].
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stronger axioms or rules of inference, but those who are committed to a more
limited foundational framework and will only accept mathematical conclusions
derived within that framework.
Notice that Sarah already accepted that Π11 comprehension was not a pred-
icative principle, otherwise she would not have been able to deduce that theorem
(⋆) about abelian groups was not predicatively provable. In accepting this Sarah
goes beyond what her foundation can formally prove. If she accepts ACA0 and
no more, then it is difficult to see how she can separate Π11-CA0 from ACA0.
Π11-CA0 implies all instances of arithmetical comprehension, so ACA0 is a sub-
system of Π11-CA0, but in order to show that it is a proper subsystem, one
typically construct a model of ACA0 that is not a model of Π
1
1-CA0. In doing
so, however, one thereby proves the consistency of ACA0, which is (assuming
that ACA0 really is consistent) not something that ACA0 can prove. Any proof
that Π11-CA0 properly extends ACA0 therefore relies on theoretical resources not
available within ACA0 itself. Needless to say, we cannot eliminate the assump-
tion of the consistency of ACA0, since if ACA0 is inconsistent, then it proves
everything that Π11-CA0 does, which is to say every sentence in the language of
second order arithmetic.
The upshot of this is that Sarah cannot prove that Π11 comprehension is not
a predicative principle merely on the basis of her acceptance of any fixed pred-
icative formal theory, no matter how strong it is, since we can re-run the above
argument for any system S such that ACA0 ⊆ S ( Π11-CA0. For Sarah or any
predicativist, the judgement of the impredicativity of Π11 comprehension must
therefore be justified by some other means. One candidate justification might
be Sarah’s acceptance of the soundness of the predicative formal theory ACA0,
or a predicative extension thereof. Alternatively, the impredicativity of Π11-CA0
might itself be taken as a basic (albeit defeasible) belief. The Π11 comprehen-
sion scheme quantifies over all sets of natural numbers, and appears to do so
in an essential way. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, Sarah should
assume that Π11-CA0 is an impredicative axiom system, and thus unacceptable
on the basis of her predicativist stance. A third option is quietism about the
impredicativity of Π11-CA0: Sarah could suspend judgement about whether or
not Π11 comprehension is justifiable on a predicative basis. Sarah’s predicativity
would thus be an entirely positive view, as Sarah would accept any statement
that can be shown to be predicatively provable (in the Feferman–Schu¨tte sense),
but not deny that a statement is predicative (save those which are predicatively
refutable). While this is a coherent position, and one which can be applied
quite generally to many foundational views, at least prima facie it fails to do
justice to the predicativist outlook. Predicativism was historically motivated
by the apparent vicious circularity of impredicative definitions, and the positive
epistemic view that those objects exist which can be defined by quantifying over
only objects already shown to exist is linked to the negative view that objects
that cannot be so defined do not exist. Without such a negative view in the
background, the positive program seems to lose some of its bite: while predica-
tive mathematics is well and good, there is little to recommend it as a stopping
point when the mathematical fruits of impredicativity are just over the horizon.
In order to make the kind of naturalistic argument sketched above, it is
not sufficient to formalise a foundational system F as a subsystem of second
order arithmetic SF in a way which is acceptable to the F -theorist. One must
also ensure that the mathematical theorems whose proof-theoretic strength is
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appealed to in the argument are formalised in a faithful way. For example, there
are theorems of topology which are provably equivalent to Π12 comprehension
[Mummert and Simpson, 2005]. Since the formal language of second order
arithmetic only allows one to quantify over countable objects, any representation
of uncountable objects must be indirect and relies on the availability of suitable
countable codes for those objects. This availability, and thus the faithfulness
of formalisations of ordinary mathematical notions in second order arithmetic,
must be proved in some suitable metatheory which can quantify directly over
the uncountable objects in question, and prove the existence of the countable
codes of those objects.2
If Rebecca wanted to invoke these theorems in her attempt to persuade Sarah
that predicativism is inadequate to mathematical practice, and thus mathemat-
ical truth, then her argument would appear to rely on a suppressed premise,
namely the faithfulness of the representation in second order arithmetic of these
topological spaces. Sarah could therefore respond that the statements in the
language of second order arithmetic which Rebecca takes to be formalisations
of theorems of topology are not, from her predicative perspective, anything of
the sort. Instead they are simply L2-sentences that are not predicatively prov-
able. For them to be formalisations of particular theorems of topology requires
that they are faithful translations of those theorems, and the proof of that faith-
fulness requires theoretical resources that, being strongly impredicative, she is
not willing to commit to.
Foundational analysis in the form sketched above thus seems to impose a
natural criterion on formalisations, namely that the faithfulness of the codings
used must be provable in a conservative extension S of a theory accepted by
proponents of the foundation being analysed. S would be a formal version
of the metatheory discussed above, with higher type variables ranging over
uncountable sets, allowing the direct formalisation of higher type objects such as
uncountable topological spaces. This would ensure reverse mathematical results
could be read as intended, i.e. as demonstrating the mathematical resources
necessary to prove given theorems of ordinary mathematics. It would then
allow the kind of naturalistic argument given by Rebecca to be evaluated by
proponents of a given foundation, within the theoretical framework they already
accept. In the ideal case, the faithfulness of the codings involved would be
provable in a conservative extension of the base theory, thus allowing reverse
mathematical results to be evaluated by anyone who accepts the axioms of that
base theory.
In the next two sections we will study more closely two historical, philosophically-
motivated foundational programs, and their connections to reverse mathematics
and subsystems of second order arithmetic: finitism in the sense descending from
Hilbert’s program in §3, and predicativism in the spirit of Weyl in §4. Before
doing so, it is worth remarking that the role played by foundational analysis
in the historical development of reverse mathematics is somewhat ambiguous.
While reverse mathematics has a broadly foundational aim, namely determining
the axioms necessary to prove theorems of ordinary mathematics, it is unclear
how much research in reverse mathematics itself has been directly motivated by
2In some cases the metatheoretic axioms required are strong: the existence of an uncount-
able topological space with a countable basis was shown by Hunter [2008] to imply the axioms
of Z2, the full system of second order arithmetic.
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foundational analysis in the sense discussed here.3
lines of research in the related field of reductive proof theory that are more
explicitly motivated
In contrast, work in the related field of reductive proof theory is more ex-
plicitly motivated by goals related to foundational analysis, namely determin-
ing what fragment of ordinary mathematics can be recovered in subsystems
of second order arithmetic that are proof-theoretically reducible to finitistic or
constructive systems. This line of research is known as the relativized Hilbert
program. Its inception is usually traced back to Bernays [1967], and its goals,
methods and results have been articulated by, amongst others, Sieg [1988] and
Feferman [1988b].
3 Finitistic reductionism
Hilbert’s program was to reduce infinitary mathematics to finitary mathematics.
He viewed finitism as a secure foundation for mathematics, free of the paradoxes
which arose from seemingly natural assumptions and normal mathematical rea-
soning about infinite collections. This reduction was to be accomplished by
giving a finitary consistency proof for infinitary mathematics, which for present
purposes can be identified with ZFC. Hilbert thought that employing infinitary
methods in mathematics, such as assuming the existence of infinite collections,
could be viewed simply as a way to supplement our finitistic theories with ideal
statements, analogous to ideal elements in algebra. Ideal statements are thus
intended to be eliminable, at least in principle: the purpose of Hilbert’s desired
consistency proof was to show that we can use infinitary mathematics to get
finitary results, and that those results are finitistically acceptable.
Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem shows that there can be no such
consistency proof, and thus that Hilbert’s program cannot be carried out in its
entirety. Many even consider Go¨del’s theorems to have shown that Hilbert’s
program is entirely bankrupt.4 While it certainly seems to block the full real-
ization of the enterprise, Simpson [1988] argues that the possibility of partial
realizations remains. But since the consistency proof Hilbert sought is out of
reach, the latter-day finitistic reductionist must find other ways to demonstrate
that their uses of ideal statements are in principle eliminable. Instead of trying
to prove the consistency of infinitary systems directly, finitistic reductions of in-
finitary systems can be carried out in a relativised way, following the template
laid down by Kreisel [1968]. We now sketch how such reductions work.5
Suppose we have two theories T1 (in a language L1) and T2 (in L2), both
of which contain primitive recursive arithmetic. Suppose also that we have a
primitive recursive set of formulae Φ ⊆ FmlL1 ∩FmlL2 containing every closed
equation t1 = t2. A proof-theoretic reduction of T1 to T2 which conserves Φ is
a partial recursive function f which, given any proof from the axioms of T1 of
3 Indeed, much of the current research in reverse mathematics is focused on other concerns,
especially the use of tools from computability theory to explore the growing constellation of
intermediate and incomparable subsystems between RCA0 and ACA0 known as the Reverse
Mathematics Zoo [Dzhafarov, 2015]. A summary of current research frontiers can be found in
Montalba´n [2011].
4For a contrary view, see Detlefsen [1979].
5An excellent survey of this topic which also details the foundational picture behind such
relativised versions of Hilbert’s program is Feferman [1988b].
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a sentence ϕ ∈ Φ, produces a proof of ϕ from the axioms of T2. If the existence
of f can be proved in T2, it then follows that T2 proves (a formalisation of) the
following conditional statement: “If T2 is consistent then T1 is consistent.” For
if T1 proves that 0 = 1, then f will transform any proof of 0 = 1 in T1 into a
proof of 0 = 1 in T2.
If the existence of a proof-theoretic reduction of this sort can be proved in a
finitary system, then we call it a finitary reduction. In order for a proof-theoretic
reduction f from an infinitary system to a finitary one to provide a partial re-
alization of Hilbert’s program, f must be a finitary reduction. Otherwise the
result has a circular character unacceptable within a reductionist program: it
would amount to using ideal methods to show that ideal methods are accept-
able. Similarly, an infinitary proof of a conservativity theorem is insufficient to
demonstrate the reducibility of an infinitary system to a finitary one.
If Hilbert had succeeded in providing a finitary consistency proof for infini-
tary mathematics then there would have been no need to mark out the boundary
between finitary and infinitary methods with any precision, as the proof would
have made use of methods which were clearly finitary in nature. In order to
obtain the conservation results that demonstrate that certain infinitary sys-
tems are finitistically reducible, and thereby partially realize Hilbert’s program,
Simpson’s route to a partial realization of Hilbert’s program requires that we
formalise our conception of a finitary system. The formal system which Simpson
selects is primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA), following the thesis proposed by
Tait [1981]. The rest of Simpson’s argument rests squarely on this identification
of finitist provability with provability in PRA: he does not offer any new consid-
erations in support of Tait’s thesis, instead simply accepting it and proceeding
accordingly.
Fixing PRA as the finitary system to which infinitary systems must be re-
duced to, the next question is which infinitary systems are finitistically reducible
to PRA. One such system isWKL0, the system obtained by adding weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma (“Every infinite subtree of 2<N has an infinite path”) to RCA0. Fried-
man [1976, unpublished] used model-theoretic techniques to show that WKL0 is
Π02 conservative over PRA, and thus consistent relative to PRA; the proof can
be found in Simpson [2009, §IX.3]. Subsequently Sieg [1985] gave a primitive
recursive proof transformation which, given a proof of a Π02 theorem ϕ in WKL0,
generates a proof of ϕ in PRA. Unlike Friedman’s result, this proof-theoretic
derivation of the conservativity theorem is itself a piece of finitistic mathematics:
it is provable within a finitary system, thus making the reduction finitary. As
the complexity of consistency statements is Π01, if WKL0 proves the consistency
of PRA then so does PRA itself. From this Simpson concludes that WKL0 is
finitistically reducible to PRA, and so the fragment of mathematical reasoning
which one can carry out in WKL0 is finitistically acceptable, in the following
sense. Any Π01 sentence provable in WKL0 is finitistically meaningful, in virtue
of its form, but it is also provable in PRA (by the conservativity theorem), and
thus finitistically provable (by Tait’s thesis). Any theorem of WKL0, such as
the Heine–Borel covering theorem or the Hahn–Banach theorem for separable
spaces, is thus legitimised as a lemma that can be invoked in order to prove a
finitistic theorem.
By referring to the reductionist project he proposes as a partial realization of
Hilbert’s program, Simpson opens himself up to the criticism that his interpre-
tation of Hilbert is a misreading, as alleged by Sieg [1990, p. 874], who suggests
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that Simpson’s project might be better understood as a partial realization of
Kronecker’s views on foundations of mathematics. While questions of historical
interpretation are important, our present purpose is not Hilbert scholarship,
but determining whether there is a defensible core to Simpson’s position, and
thus whether the reverse mathematics of WKL0 make a contribution to founda-
tional analysis. Starting from Tait’s thesis that finitist provability is provability
in PRA, together with the Hilbertian contention that only Π01 sentences are
finitistically meaningful, the finitistically provable conservativity theorem gives
us strong prima facie reason to take Simpson’s finitistic reductionism seriously.
Since the foundational analysis of finitistic reductionism can be carried out in
a base theory that is itself finitistically reducible, its results are available to
the finitist, who can thereby see that (for example) the Heine–Borel theorem is
finitistically reducible, but the Bolzano–Weierstraß theorem is not.
With the positive case in hand, we turn to potential criticisms of Simpson’s
view. The first is his reliance on Tait’s thesis, which has taken fire from many
quarters. Broadly speaking, such complaints fall into two camps: that PRA is
too weak to encompass all of finitistic reasoning, and that it is too strong. Those
in the former camp include Kreisel [1958], who concluded that finitist provability
coincides with provability in PA. Detlefsen [1979] argued that adding instances
of a restricted version of the ω-rule is also finitistically acceptable, although
Detlefsen’s position has in turn been criticised, for example by Ignjatovic´ [1994].
Two proposals that fall into the latter camp are made by Ganea [2010]. From
the broad spread of conclusions reached it is clear that what finitistic reasoning
consists in is, to say the least, disputed. However, Tait’s arguments provide a
robust defence of the thesis that primitive recursive arithmetic demarcates the
limits of finitistic reasoning, and moreover, one that has gained wide acceptance.
We therefore conclude that on the one hand, extant arguments against Tait’s
thesis entail that we should not consider Simpson’s identification of finitistic
reducibility with proof-theoretic reducibility to PRA to be established; but on
the other, since a strong case can be made in favour of the thesis, Simpson’s
finitistic reductionism should be taken seriously as a foundation of mathematics.
Burgess [2010] criticises the finitistic reducibility of WKL0 from another di-
rection, arguing that the analysis leading to the identification of finitistic prov-
ability with provability in the formal system PRA cannot be carried out from
a finitistic point of view. This means that the conservativity theorem does not,
by itself, justify the finitist in believing any Π01 sentence provable in WKL0. At
best, it provides a recipe for producing PRA proofs from WKL0 proofs, which
the finitist must then verify by assuring themselves that each of the axioms of
PRA used in the proof is in fact finitistically acceptable. Burgess offers the fol-
lowing way out for the finitistic reductionist (p. 139): by limiting the induction
principle in RCA0 and WKL0 we can define subtheories RCA∗ and WKL∗, in
which Σ01 induction is replaced by Σ
0
0 induction plus a sentence asserting that
the exponential function is total.6 WKL∗ is conservative over a proper subthe-
6The theories RCA∗ andWKL∗ are often referred to in the reverse mathematics literature as
RCA
∗
0 and WKL
∗
0, for example by Simpson and Smith [1986], who first isolated these systems.
However, this notation is confusing because in most other cases in reverse mathematics, the
superscript is used to refer to additional set existence axioms adjoined to the theory, as in the
case of WKL+
0
, ACA+
0
, and so on, while the subscript is used to indicate a restricted induction
axiom (ACA versus ACA0, for example). We therefore use Montalba´n [2011]’s convention
and refer to the system defined by the basic axioms, the recursive comprehension scheme,
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ory of PRA, known as I∆0 + exp, and since provability in this system does not
press up against the bounds of finitist provability, the finitist can recognise that
all proofs in this system are finitistically acceptable [Simpson and Smith, 1986].
Many, albeit not all, of the theorems of ordinary mathematics that are provable
in WKL0 are also provable in WKL∗. For Π
0
1 sentences provable in WKL∗ the
finitist can therefore work in the infinitary system without needing to check that
the resulting proof in PRA uses only finitistically acceptable principles, since
this is already guaranteed by the conservativity theorem—which, by a result of
Sieg [1991], is finitistically provable.
A further objection is that Simpson’s argument does not in any way pick out
WKL0 as the unique formal counterpart of the program of finitistic reduction-
ism. Brown and Simpson [1993] present a system they callWKL+0 , which extends
WKL0 with a strong formal version BCT of the Baire Category Theorem. They
prove, using a forcing argument, that WKL+0 is Π
1
1 conservative over RCA0. It
follows from a result of Parsons [1970] that WKL+0 is Π
0
2 conservative over PRA,
and that this conservativity theorem can be proved in PRA itself.7 So while
WKL0 is, modulo Tait’s thesis, a finitistically reducible system, it is but one
partial realization of Hilbert’s program. WKL+0 is demonstrably another, and
indeed a stronger one, since it satisfies the same criteria of finitistic reducibility
whilst properly extending WKL0. One might think that this undermines Simp-
son’s claim that the Big Five subsystems of second order arithmetic correspond
to existing foundational programs, but this is not a fair reading of Simpson’s
position: he does not claim that these systems are the unique formal correlates
of these foundational approaches. It is consistent with his position that there
are a variety of infinitary yet finitistically reducible systems. Nevertheless, it is
weak Ko¨nig’s lemma that has been found equivalent to many theorems of or-
dinary mathematics, not BCT. This is evidence for the (defeasible) claim that
WKL0 is a mathematically natural stopping point in a way that WKL
+
0 is not.
WKL
+
0 is finitistically reducible just as WKL0 is, while being a proper extension
of it, so mathematically natural stopping points do not appear to always align
cleanly with justificatory stopping points—or if they do, then we have not yet
identified the sources of justification of these axiom systems in a sufficiently
fine-grained way.
Patey and Yokoyama [2016] have shown that the statement known as Ram-
sey’s theorem for pairs and two colours, RT22, is finitistically reducible. More-
over, by proving an amalgamation theorem, they also show that WKL0+RT
2
2 is
finitistically reducible. Since RT22 is incomparable with WKL0 [Jockusch, 1972,
Liu, 2012], this is a substantial extension of the principles of proof known to
be finitistically reducible, which now includes a large class of combinatorial and
model-theoretic principles that have been the focus of much of recent research
in reverse mathematics (for a survey of these principles, see §4–5 of Shore [2010];
a more comprehensive introduction to the study of combinatorial principles re-
lated to Ramsey’s theorem is Hirschfeldt [2014]).
Having considered the extent to which the reverse mathematics of systems
and induction for Σ00 formulas plus the totality of exponentiation, as RCA∗, and the system
obtained by adding weak Ko¨nig’s lemma to RCA∗ as WKL∗.
7Avigad [1996] showed how the forcing arguments of Brown and Simpson [1993] and Har-
rington could be formalised in the base theory RCA0, thus giving a new effective proof of
the Π1
1
conservativity of WKL+
0
over RCA0, with only a polynomial increase in the length of
proofs.
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such as WKL0 provides a foundational analysis of the program of finitistic re-
ductionism, and the relationship of this reductive program to Hilbert’s, we now
turn to the study of predicativism in the spirit of Weyl and its connections to
subsystems of second order arithmetic such as ACA0 and ATR0.
4 Predicativism and predicative reductionism
Predicativism is the view that only those sets that can be defined without ref-
erence to themselves are legitimate, existing objects. Predicativism given the
natural numbers is the view that the natural numbers N form a completed, in-
finite totality and thus quantification over the natural numbers is a legitimate
way to define sets. For the rest of this article, whenever ‘predicativism’ and
its cognates are invoked, it is predicativism given the natural numbers that
is meant. Predicativism can be seen as a middle ground between finitism, in
which only finite entities are accorded real existence, and forms of set-theoretic
platonism, where defining objects by impredicative quantification is acceptable
because the objects being quantified over are considered to have an existence in-
dependent of their definition. Although the predicativist only accepts definitions
that quantify over objects that are not themselves the subjects of the definition,
collections introduced by previous predicative definitions are legitimate objects
that one may quantify over when defining new objects. Predicative definability
is thus an iterable notion. Given the natural numbers N we may define the col-
lection R1 of sets definable using only the language of arithmetic and quantifiers
ranging over the natural numbers (in other words, the arithmetical sets). We
may then take the collection of sets definable by formulas in the second-order
language of arithmetic, but where the second order quantifiers are relativized to
range over R1. Since the second order quantifiers do not range over the objects
being defined (as they are restricted to ranging over objects we have previously
guaranteed the existence of), this gives us an expanded collection of predica-
tively definable sets of natural numbers R2. The natural next step is to form
a ramified hierarchy of sets of natural numbers. Given a domain D ⊆ P(ω),
let D∗ be the collection of sets of natural numbers defined by formulas in the
language L2 of second order arithmetic, ϕ
D, where the second order quantifiers
in ϕ are relativized to range over D. We then define the ramified analytical
hierarchy by transfinite recursion on ordinals as
R0 = ∅
Rα+1 = (Rα)
∗
Rλ =
⋃
β<λ
Rβ for limit λ.
The ramified theory of types, developed by Russell and Whitehead in Prin-
cipia Mathematica [Whitehead and Russell, 1925], proved too cumbersome for
real use in mathematics. Hermann Weyl’s predicative development of analysis
in Das Kontinuum [Weyl, 1918] showed that a theory of the arithmetical sets
R1 is already sufficient to develop a substantial portion of classical analysis, in-
cluding a sequential form of the least upper bound principle. A modern formal
reconstruction of arithmetical analysis in the mode of Weyl is given by the sys-
tem ACA0, defined as RCA0 plus the arithmetical comprehension axiom: every
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set definable by an arithmetical formula exists.8 Weyl showed that the amount
of mathematics one could develop in his predicative framework was extensive,
and allowed one to recover much of classical analysis. The reverse mathematics
of ACA0 can be viewed as a continuation of this project, showing us not only
what mathematics can be predicatively proved, but also which theorems cannot
be proved in RCA0 or WKL0, and actually require arithmetical comprehension.
This includes theorems in analysis such as the Cauchy convergence theorem and
the Ascoli lemma, but also theorems from algebra and combinatorics: that ev-
ery countable vector space over Q has a basis, and Ramsey’s theorem that for
every k ∈ N, every colouring of [N]k has a homogeneous set.
Unlike WKL0, which is only reducible to a finitistic system, and not a fini-
tistic system in and of itself, ACA0 is a formal system whose axioms can all be
directly justified on predicative grounds. No general, limitative account of what
principles are predicatively acceptable is required in order to show that ACA0 is
a predicative system. As indicated above, however, predicative definability is an
iterable notion, and consequently Weyl accepted a Principle of Iteration that,
as Feferman [1988a]’s analysis demonstrates, goes beyond what his restriction
to the arithmetically definable sets allows.9 The strength of Weyl’s system with
the Principle of Iteration therefore exceeds that of ACA0, as sketched in §8 of
Feferman [1988a], although Feferman and Ja¨ger [1993, 1996] proved that it is
still a predicative system, in a sense we will now explore.
The iterability of predicative definability suggests that there should be a
correspondingly iterable notion of predicative provability, and it is this notion
that is the subject of Feferman and Schu¨tte’s influential analysis of the limits
of predicativity. The ramified analytical hierarchy provides a standard model
on which to base the development of predicative theories, starting with the lan-
guage. Supplementing the usual first order language of arithmetic, the language
of ramified analysis includes a stock of set variables Xβ , Y β , Zβ, . . . for each re-
cursive ordinal β. Iterated predicative definability is formalised by a transfinite
progression of formal systems of ramified analysis RAα. Each such system has
the ramified comprehension scheme
∃Xβ∀n(n ∈ Xβ ↔ ϕ(n))
for all β ≤ α and all formulas ϕ(n) in the language of ramified analysis such
that the bound and free set variables in the formula all have ordinal indices
smaller than β. It also has the following limit rule, where for all (codes for)
limit ordinals λ ≤ α, and each formula of ramified analysis ψ(Xλ) with just Xλ
free, if ψ(X0), . . . , ψ(Xβ), . . . for all β < λ, then ψ(Xλ) also holds.
This definition just leaves open how far the iteration process can go and still
be considered predicative. Suspicion naturally attaches to the ordinals indexing
the theories RAα, for two reasons. Firstly, the question of whether a recursive
linear order ≺ is a wellordering is, in general, impredicative: the statement that
≺ is wellordered quantifies over all sets of natural numbers. Secondly, in the
language of ramified analysis there is no single formula that expresses that ≺ is
8Here we brush over the details of the connection between Weyl’s system and subsystems of
second order arithmetic, for which Feferman [1988a] is the authoritative source. An accessible
summary of Weyl’s development of arithmetical analysis can be found in Feferman [2005].
9See §7 of Weyl [1918] for a definition of the Principle of Iteration, and the discussion in
Feferman [1988a], especially that on pp. 264–5 of the revised version in Feferman [1998].
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wellordered. As far as this second issue is concerned, let WOβ(≺) be the state-
ment that no set Xβ codes an infinite descending sequence in the linear order ≺.
Then, by the limit rule, any proof in a system of ramified analysis that WO0(≺)
can be lifted to a proof that WOβ(≺) for each new β introduced. The first issue
can then be resolved by the introduction of the notion of a predicative ordinal.
The predicative ordinals are those recursive ordinals which can be predicatively
proved to be wellordered, and the predicatively acceptable systems of ramified
analysis are those indexed by predicative ordinals. This might seem circular,
since we are using the notion of a predicative ordinal in order to characterise
predicative provability, and predicative provability in order to determine which
are the predicative ordinals. But as the following autonomy condition should
make clear, this is not the case. 0 is a predicative ordinal. Suppose ≺ is a re-
cursive linear order and α is a predicative ordinal. If RAα ⊢WO
0(≺), then the
ordinal β = ot(≺) is predicative. This allows us to define predicative provability
in terms of autonomous transfinite progressions of systems of ramified analysis,
as follows: a sentence ϕ of ramified analysis is predicatively provable if there is
a predicative ordinal δ such that RAδ ⊢ ϕ. On the basis of these definitions,
Feferman [1964] and Schu¨tte [1964, 1965] determined the limit of predicativity,
namely the least ordinal that cannot be proved to be wellordered within an
autonomous progression of systems of ramified analysis. This is the ordinal Γ0,
also known as the Feferman–Schu¨tte ordinal, or the ordinal of predicativity.10
With the limits of predicativity characterised in this manner,11 we might
now ask how much of second order arithmetic can be justified on predicative
grounds. Reducing subsystems of second order arithmetic to predicative sys-
tems has practical benefits for the predicativist, since ramified systems are so
intractable in terms of the actual pursuit of mathematics. It is also valuable
from the point of view of foundational analysis, since it allows one to determine
the amount of mathematics recoverable in a predicative framework.
A formal system T is predicatively reducible if there is an α < Γ0 such that T
is proof-theoretically reducible to RAα, and locally predicatively reducible if it
is proof-theoretically reducible to RAΓ0 =
⋃
α<Γ0
RAα, where proof-theoretic
reducibility is defined as in §3.12 Predicative reductionism thus offers a reduc-
tionist program similar in spirit to the finitistic reductionism discussed in §3.13
By a theorem of Friedman, McAloon, and Simpson [1982], the subsystem of
second order arithmetic known as ATR0 is locally predicatively reducible, with
proof-theoretic ordinal Γ0. Moreover, it is conservative over RAΓ0 for arith-
metical sentences, and even for Π11 sentences.
14 So not only does ATR0 agree
10For a more detailed summary and historical background on predicativism, predicative
provability, and predicative reductionism, we refer the reader to Feferman [2005]. Complete
proofs of Feferman and Schu¨tte’s key results can be found in Schu¨tte [1977, ch. VIII] or Pohlers
[2009, ch. 8].
11Notwithstanding Weaver [2009]’s claim that Γ0, as well as larger recursive ordinals such
as the small Veblen ordinal, can be proved to be wellfounded using only predicative means.
12In his survey of predicativity, Feferman [2005] prefers the terms predicatively justifiable
and locally predicatively justifiable to predicatively reducible and locally predicatively reducible.
This paper sticks to the older terminology.
13The comparison between finitistic reductionism and predicative reductionism has been
considered explicitly in these terms by Simpson [1985, §5].
14 Strictly speaking there is no common notion of a Π1
1
statement shared between the
language of second order arithmetic and the language of ramified analysis. However, given a
Π11 sentence ϕ in the language of second order arithmetic with bound set variables X1, . . . ,Xn,
such that ϕ is provable in ATR0, there exists α < Γ0 such that the translation ϕ∗ of ϕ into
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with the predicative part of ramified analysis about arithmetical truth, it also
proves the same theorems about the arithmetical properties of all real numbers.
The formal system ATR0 consists of ACA0 plus a scheme of arithmetical
transfinite recursion. This states that the arithmetical operations can be iter-
ated, starting from any set X ⊆ N, along any countable wellordering; a full
formal definition can be found in Simpson [2009, §V.2]. ATR0 is a significant
strengthening of ACA0, taking us from classical analysis to parts of descriptive
set theory: arithmetical transfinite recursion is equivalent over RCA0 to the
perfect set theorem (every uncountable closed set has a perfect subset), Lusin’s
separation theorem (any two disjoint analytic sets can be separated by a Borel
set), and a number of statements concerning ordinals, for example that any two
countable wellorderings are comparable.
Burgess [2010, p. 140]’s caution about conservativity applies to the case of
ATR0 and predicative provability just as it does to the case of WKL0 and fini-
tist provability. The conservativity theorem in this case will, for a proof p in
ATR0 of a Π
1
1 statement ϕ, provide a primitive recursive function f that trans-
forms ATR0 proofs of Π
1
1 sentences into proofs in RAΓ0 , so that f(p) is a proof
in RAα of ϕ
∗, for some α < Γ0. Nevertheless, the predicative mathemati-
cian cannot immediately conclude that ϕ∗ is predicatively provable, because
the Feferman–Schu¨tte analysis of the limits of predicativity is external to the
predicativist standpoint, and thus not something the predicativist has access
to: they cannot, from a predicative standpoint, prove that all ordinals below
Γ0 are wellfounded, but can only verify of particular presentations of ordinals
below Γ0 that they do indeed code ordinals. To recognise that ϕ
∗ is indeed
predicatively provable, the predicativist must first verify that α is a predicative
ordinal, by carrying out the bootstrapped process of proving linear orderings to
be wellfounded within predicative systems of ramified analysis described by the
analysis of predicativity.15
Paralleling the response Burgess sketches on behalf of the proponent of fini-
tistic reductionism (discussed in §3), one might think that (globally, not merely
locally) predicatively reducible subsystems of second order arithmetic offer a
way to gain the benefits of predicative reductionism without running into the
problems faced by locally predicatively reducible systems such as ATR0. Unfor-
tunately the advantages that working within predicatively reducible subsystems
of second order arithmetic offer over working with the predicative system ACA0
are minimal: as Simpson [1985, §5] stresses, there are few theorems of ordi-
nary mathematics that are known to be true in the hyperarithmetic sets HYP
(when viewed as an ω-model) that are not already true in the arithmetical sets
ARITH. This is salient for predicative provability because HYP = RωCK
1
, the
the language of ramified analysis is provable in RAα, where ϕ∗ is obtained by replacing each
Xk for 1 ≤ k ≤ n with X
0
k
.
15Burgess [2010, p. 140] writes that “If we move up to the level of predicativism, the result
on the conservativeness of the system called ATR0 over the system called IR has the same
character as the result on the conservativeness of WKL0 over PRA.” In a similar vein, Simpson
[1985, p. 154] writes that “Feferman [1964] has argued successfully that his formal system IR
and others like it constitute a precise explication of predicative provability.” The system
IR was introduced by Feferman [1964], and is characterised by the ∆1
1
comprehension rule
and the Bar Rule. Strictly speaking, the quoted remarks are incorrect, since IR is a not a
predicative system, but instead a locally predicatively reducible one, just as ATR0 is. Burgess’s
point about conservativity, properly reformulated in terms of conservativity over RAΓ0 , thus
applies to IR just as it applies to ATR0.
16
sets definable by iterating the ramified analytical hierarchy up to ωCK1 . HYP is
therefore an extension of the standard model RΓ0 of ramified analysis up to Γ0,
so if an L2-sentence ϕ is false in HYP, then it is not predicatively provable.
Simpson argues that the many theorems which provable in ATR0 but which
do not hold in the ω-model HYP demonstrate the benefits of predicative reduc-
tionism, but not being predicatively provable, these theorems have only instru-
mental value to the predicativist: statements such as the perfect set theorem,
or the theorem that any two countable wellorderings are comparable can be
used to prove predicative theorems, but are not themselves predicative. All
this goes to show that the mathematics that can be recovered by reductionist
programs such as finitistic reductionism and predicative reductionism cannot be
simply read off from reverse mathematical results, based on identifications (such
as that of WKL0 for finitistic reductionism, or ATR0 for predicative reduction-
ism) of subsystems of second order arithmetic associated with that foundational
framework.
5 Shore’s program
However much it may borrow from other areas of mathematical logic, reverse
mathematics is ultimately a proof-theoretic endeavour. Given a theorem of
ordinary mathematics, the reverse mathematician seeks to find a subsystem of
Z2 that is equivalent over a weak base theory to the theorem concerned. She
thereby finds the proof-theoretic strength of the theorem. Rooted in niceties of
formal systems such as axiom schemes and complexity hierarchies of formulae,
this approach may seem awkward and even unnatural to mathematicians in
more mainstream fields. As number theorist Barry Mazur says [Mazur, 2008,
p. 224, emphasis in original],
when it comes to a crisis of rigorous argument, the open secret is
that, for the most part, mathematicians who are not focussed on
the architecture of formal systems per se, mathematicians who are
consumers rather than providers, somehow achieve a sense of utterly
firm conviction in their mathematical doings, without actually going
through the exercise of translating their particular argumentation
into a brand-name formal system.
Turning to the specific case of the strength of mathematical theorems, Shore
[2010, p. 381] contends that most mathematicians do not approach this task
from the viewpoint of reverse mathematics:
While they may concern themselves with (or attempt to avoid) the
axiom of choice or transfinite recursion, they certainly do not think
about (nor care), for example, how much induction is used in any
particular proof.
Shore goes on to argue that adopting a computational approach to reverse math-
ematics would solve this exegetical problem, providing a natural way for math-
ematicians to understand the motivations and results of reverse mathematics.
A computational account of reverse mathematics can be considered plau-
sible only if mathematical principles have computational content. At least in
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the case of arithmetic it is clear that this is true, as demonstrated by the pio-
neering results of Go¨del, Church, Turing, Post, Kleene and Rosser in the 1930s.
Computability theory holds an important status in reverse mathematics, both
in virtue of its relationship to subsystems of reverse mathematics and because it
provides a battery of tools for proving reverse mathematical results. It is these
principles and techniques which Shore appeals to when constructing his account
of computational reverse mathematics.
In particular, the major subsystems of second order arithmetic correspond
to principles from computability theory. As well as shedding light on the model
theory of these systems, these connections give us the basis for Shore’s computa-
tional reverse mathematics. The foundation of these correspondences lies in the
notion of an ω-model. These are L2-structures whose first order parts consists
of the standard natural numbers ω = { 0, 1, 2, . . . }, and whose arithmetical vo-
cabulary is interpreted in the standard way, with a second order part S ⊆ P(ω).
ω-models are thus uniquely distinguished by their second order parts, and which
sentences of L2 a given ω-modelM satisfies is determined entirely by the sets in
its second order part. In the rest of the paper we shall therefore allow ourselves
some sloppiness and identify ω-models with their second order parts whenever
no ambiguity is possible.
Since ω-models of RCA0 satisfy recursive comprehension, they are closed
under Turing reducibility: given an ω-model S of RCA0, if X ∈ S and Y ≤T X ,
then X ∈ S. They are also closed under recursive joins: if X,Y ∈ S, then
X ⊕ Y ∈ S, where the recursive join operation is defined as
(2) X ⊕ Y = { 2x | x ∈ X } ∪ { 2y + 1 | y ∈ Y } .
Subsets of P(ω) which are closed under Turing reducibility and recursive joins
are known as Turing ideals, and the ω-models of RCA0 are precisely the Turing
ideals.
Similar closure conditions apply to the ω-models of the other main subsys-
tems of second order arithmetic. ω-models of ACA0 are Turing ideals, since
RCA0 is a subtheory of ACA0, but these models are also closed under the Tur-
ing jump operator, while those of Π11-CA0 are closed under the hyperjump.
Computability-theoretic closure conditions also characterise the ω-models of
the intermediate systems WKL0 and ATR0. The ω-models of WKL0 are related
to the Jockush–Soare low basis theorem [Jockusch and Soare, 1972]. The ω-
models of ATR0 are closed under hyperarithmetic reducibility, although there
are some subtleties here; see §VIII.4 and §VIII.6 of Simpson [2009]. The Big Five
thus correspond closely to a hierarchy of computational principles of increasing
power.
Shore proposes a new approach to reverse mathematics based on taking
these computability-theoretic characterisations of the ω-models of subsystems
of Z2 at face value as measuring the complexity of the theorems equivalent to
those systems. In place of the usual relations employed in reverse mathematics,
namely provability and logical equivalence over a weak base theory, he offers
the notions of computable entailment and computable equivalence.
Definition 5.1. Let C be a Turing ideal, and let ϕ be a sentence of second
order arithmetic. C computably satisfies ϕ if ϕ is true in the ω-model whose
second order part consists of C. A sentence ψ computably entails ϕ, ψ |=c ϕ, if
every Turing ideal C computably satisfying ψ also computably satisfies ϕ. Two
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sentences ψ and ϕ are computably equivalent, ψ ≡c ϕ, if each computably entails
the other. These definitions extend to theories in the standard way.
Computable entailment removes any need for an explicit base theory: this
role is instead played by the restriction of the class of models under consideration
to ω-models whose second order parts are Turing ideals. The ω-models of RCA0
are precisely those models, so the base theory has not disappeared entirely, but
manifested itself in a different way, by being baked into the definition of the
computable entailment relation. Since not all L2-structures are ω-models, fail-
ures of computable entailment are stronger than failures of logical implication
over RCA0, since the former entails the latter, but not vice versa. Conversely,
computable entailment is weaker than logical implication over RCA0. By the
Henkin–Orey completeness theorem for ω-logic [Henkin, 1954, Orey, 1956], the
computable entailment relation is extensionally equivalent to allowing unre-
stricted use of the ω-rule in RCA0. The ω-rule is an infinitary rule of inference
that, from the infinite set of premises ϕ(0), ϕ(1), . . . , ϕ(n), . . . for all numerals
n, one may infer the universal statement ∀nϕ(n). Proofs using the ω-rule can be
represented by wellfounded, countably branching trees. Second order arithmetic
with the ω-rule is complete for Π11 sentences, but not for Σ
1
1 sentences [Rosser,
1937].
Shore puts forward a number of considerations in support of his proposal.
(1) Computational reverse mathematics unites proofs of implications (and
hence equivalences) with proofs of nonimplications (and hence inequiva-
lences).
(2) Computational reverse mathematics offers a more direct route to the com-
plexity measures we take to underpin the identification of the strength of
theorems of ordinary mathematics.
(3) Computational mathematics is a more natural framework for ordinary
mathematicians.
(4) Computational reverse mathematics provides a way to deal directly with
uncountable structures and extend reverse mathematics to the study of
theorems concerning essentially uncountable structures.
These considerations can be understood as arguments for two quite different
conclusions. The first is that computable entailment is an important reducibility
notion with intrinsic mathematical interest, one which merits and will reward
further study.16 The second is that it should be the primary tool we use to carry
out the general task of reverse mathematics, namely to show what mathematical
resources are needed to prove ordinary mathematical theorems. Shore does not
explicitly endorse either of these options; neither does he propose computational
reverse mathematics as a framework in which to carry out foundational analy-
sis. However, by reviewing the reasons underlying his proposal, it becomes clear
that arguments based on these considerations make adopting computational re-
verse mathematics as a first-class replacement for classical reverse mathematics
16A comparable notion that provides a finer-grained degree structure is Weihrauch reducibil-
ity, recently taken up in the reverse mathematics context by Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst, Mileti,
and Shafer [2016], but a comparison of Weihrauch reducibility to computational reverse math-
ematics is beyond the scope of this paper.
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a serious option. This being the case, it seems reasonable to wonder whether his
framework can contribute to the analysis of foundational programs just as clas-
sical reverse mathematics does. Before attempting to answer this question, we
first analyse in detail Shore’s considerations in favour of computational reverse
mathematics.
5.1 Unity of reverse mathematics
The first consideration in favour of computational reverse mathematics is that
(1) computable entailment unites proofs of implications with the existing prac-
tice of using computability-theoretic tools to construct Turing ideals witnessing
the failures of implications, bringing a unity to the methods of proof in reverse
mathematics. The procedure is particularly straightforward when the sentences
in question are Π12, where the following template applies. Given Π
1
2 statements
Φ ≡ ∀X∃Y ϕ(X,Y ) and Ψ ≡ ∀X∃Y ψ(X,Y ), one constructs a Turing ideal C
where for every X ∈ C, there exists an Y ∈ C such that ϕ(X,Y ), but there is no
Y ∈ C such that ψ(X,Y ). C is therefore the second-order part of an ω-model
that satisfies RCA0 and Φ, but not Ψ, and so RCA0 does not prove that Φ im-
plies Ψ. Since many important mathematical theorems are Π12, the technique
is widely applicable. For instance, to show that weak Ko¨nig’s lemma does not
imply arithmetical comprehension, we use the Jockush–Soare low basis theorem
to prove the existence of an ω-model M of WKL0 in which all sets are low.
Such a model will not contain 0′, and thus M 6|= ACA0, since ACA0 proves the
existence of the Turing jump.
It is clear how Shore’s observation leads to his definition of the computable
entailment relation, but to use it to support the adoption of computational re-
verse mathematics as the preferred general methodology in reverse mathemat-
ics, we must formulate a more explicit argument. The following reconstruction
seems reasonable: that (1a) unity in methods of proof in reverse mathematics
is a theoretical virtue, and that (1b) computational reverse mathematics pos-
sesses this unity in greater degree than classical reverse mathematics. Granting
(1a) is compatible with there being other theoretical virtues, such as tractabil-
ity, not requiring strong background assumptions, and so on. We stipulate for
the sake of argument that (1c) the other theoretical virtues of computational
reverse mathematics are at least as great as those of classical reverse mathemat-
ics. From (1a–c), it follows that computational reverse mathematics is a more
theoretically virtuous framework than classical reverse mathematics in which to
carry out reverse mathematics.
In the next two sections we shall discover that we have reason to doubt (1c),
but for now let us grant it and concentrate on the more immediately problematic
premise (1b). By the soundness theorem for first order logic, from exhibiting a
model of RCA0+Φ+¬Ψ we can infer that there is no proof in RCA0 of Φ→ Ψ.
This shows that there is a unity in the methods of proof of classical reverse
mathematics: to demonstrate an implication we prove that the formal system
RCA0 proves it, and to demonstrate a nonimplication we prove that the formal
system RCA0 does not prove the relevant implication. The soundness and com-
pleteness theorems for first order logic unite proof-theoretic and model-theoretic
methods. If computational reverse mathematics has a greater unity of methods
of proof, it can only be in a methodological sense, since as Shore points out,
in practice the vast majority of proofs of nonimplications are carried out by
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constructing Turing ideals. But if the unity of methods of proof we are con-
cerned with is merely methodological, concerning how practitioners happen to
prove nonimplications in classical reverse mathematics, then premise (1a) starts
to look shaky, since it seems entirely reasonable to take the unity of methods
of proof (in this methodological sense) to be a purely instrumental virtue of a
framework for reverse mathematics, and not a theoretical one. Even if we grant
that computational reverse mathematics is better, from an instrumental point
of view, than classical reverse mathematics as a framework for reverse math-
ematics, this seems like a minor reason to adopt it when weightier theoretical
considerations are on the table.
5.2 Complexity and difficulty of proof
A more substantial motivation can be found in Shore’s suggestive remarks about
the relationship between degrees of computability and methods of proof. The
essential point is as follows. Proving a theorem that can be stated in the form
“For all X such that . . . , there exists a Y such that . . . ”—that is to say, as
a Π1n sentence—can be understood as providing, given as input a countably
representable mathematical structure A, a function or relation F on A. As we
have seen, given some A, a corresponding F can be more or less complex, de-
pending on the theorem. In classical reverse mathematics, the proof-theoretic
strength of the theorem depends on where such F can be found in the hierar-
chy of Turing degrees relativized to A. Shore proposes that we give a direct
formulation of this complexity measure—the difficulty of computing a solution
(the function or relation F) given a problem (the structure A)—rather than
mediating it through first order logical theories. Doing so “formalizes the in-
tuition that ‘being harder to prove’ means ‘harder to compute”’ [Shore, 2013,
p, 153]. Taking this underlying intuition into account, the appeal of Shore’s
approach becomes more clear: since computation across nonstandard models of
arithmetic is highly non-absolute, restricting the interpretation of arithmetical
vocabulary to the standard natural numbers ω allows us to fix an single under-
lying notion of computation, and thus the Turing reducibility relation ≤T that
allows us to compare the complexity of solutions provided by theorems directly.
This is not available within the classical reverse mathematics framework where
the base theory RCA0 provides at best a weak constraint on the models of the
arithmetical part of the theory.
We can regiment this argument as follows. (2a) The difficulty of proving
a Π1n sentence ∀X∃Y ϕ(X,Y ) is just the difficulty of, given a problem X ⊆ ω,
computing a solution Y ⊆ ω such that ϕ(X,Y ). (2b) Computable entailment
captures the difficulty of—given a problemX ⊆ ω—computing a solution Y ⊆ ω
such that ϕ(X,Y ) better than RCA0-provability does. Therefore, computable
entailment captures the difficulty of proving Π1n sentences better than RCA0-
provability.
The content of the intuition (2a) that Shore takes his view to be formalising
is, at least on a na¨ıve reading, somewhat problematic. Firstly, the mathemati-
cian’s standard understanding of difficulty of proof does not square with Shore’s
account: theorems in number theory are not thought less difficult to prove just
because the solutions are not highly uncomputable. Secondly, while the notion
of degrees of uncomputability is clear, it is arguable whether this measures dif-
ficulty of computation. Since the Turing jump and True Arithmetic are both
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uncomputable sets, and thus both intractable problems for finite computers,
even idealised ones with unbounded time and space such as Turing machines,
there is good reason to consider both of these sets equally difficult to compute,
viz., impossible. We shall have more to say on this point in §7, but for now let
us try to sidestep these issues by reformulating the argument above.
To do so, we must reject the na¨ıve reading of the two notions that figure
in Shore’s equivalence between difficulty of proof and difficulty of computation.
Instead of the mathematician’s standard understanding of difficulty of proof, let
us take “being harder to prove” to mean “requiring stronger axioms to prove”,
since this is the standard of difficulty salient to reverse mathematics. To resolve
the second difficulty, we replace the vague statement “harder to compute” with
an explicit reference to the notion of relative computability. The reformulated
argument then runs as follows. (2a*) The strength of axioms which entail a Π1n
sentence ∀X∃Y ϕ(X,Y ) is precisely captured by—given a problem X ⊆ ω—the
degrees of uncomputability of solutions Y ⊆ ω such that ϕ(X,Y ). (2b*) Com-
putable entailment captures the degrees of uncomputability—given a problem
X ⊆ ω—of solutions Y ⊆ ω such that ϕ(X,Y ) better than RCA0-provability
does. Therefore, computable entailment captures the strength of assumptions
which entail Π1n sentences better than RCA0-provability.
Premise (2b*) is well supported, given the non-absoluteness of Turing com-
putability across nonstandard models (modulo the usual questions about the ex-
istence of the unique standard natural number structure ω, and the background
theory needed to establish it). We therefore focus on (2a*), which is distinctly
more plausible than (2a), since we already know that the Big Five subsystems
of second order arithmetic are based on computability-theoretic principles, and
that the hierarchy of proof-theoretic strength of these systems correlates with
the Turing degree of solutions whose existence is asserted in theorems equivalent
to these systems.
A contentious point in assessing (2a*) is the status of induction axioms.
Neeman [2011] proves that Σ11 induction is required to prove that Jullien’s inde-
composability theorem implies weak Σ11 choice: neither the Σ
0
1 induction axiom
of RCA0, nor even ∆
1
1 induction, suffices. If we take the classical reverse math-
ematics framework to privilege RCA0 as a base theory then this is prima facie
problematic. Since computational reverse mathematics fixes the first order part
of the model as the standard natural numbers ω, it does not have this difficulty.
One problem with this view is that induction axioms are also a form set of ex-
istence principle, namely bounded comprehension schemes for finite sets. The
Σ01 induction scheme is equivalent over RCA∗ to bounded Σ
0
1 comprehension:
the scheme that for every n ∈ N the set X = { k < n | ϕ(k) } exists, where
ϕ(x) is any Σ01 formula. Stronger induction schemes are likewise equivalent
to stronger bounded comprehension schemes. Simpson and Smith [1986] show
that a number of theorems from algebra are equivalent over RCA∗ to Σ
0
1 induc-
tion. This undermines the idea that classical reverse mathematics should be
identified with reverse mathematics in RCA0, but perhaps this is no bad thing.
Computational reverse mathematics, on the other hand, appears to trivialise
bounded comprehension schemes, since they are all computably entailed. Π1n
theorems, central to all of reverse mathematics, thus become almost the only
subject countenanced (further reverse mathematical equivalences trivialised by
the computable entailment relation are considered in §6).
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5.3 Accessibility of reverse mathematics
Another of Shore’s motivations in introducing computational reverse mathe-
matics is expository: making the tools and results of reverse mathematics more
accessible to ordinary mathematicians who do not think, as logicians do, in
terms of formal theories and proof systems. Although it still involves formalisa-
tion, computational reverse mathematics does allow us to sidestep some formal
aspects of reverse mathematics. Instead of proving equivalences to syntacti-
cally defined subsystems of second order arithmetic, we can work directly with
computability-theoretic and combinatorial closure conditions. Moreover, it al-
lows us to use induction in the standard way, for any property, not just those
definable in the language of arithmetic with a single first order quantifier.
Making reverse mathematics more accessible to ordinary mathematicians is
clearly a valuable goal, but since computable entailment is not extensionally
equivalent to provability in the standard base theory RCA0, this is not by itself
sufficient to motivate our adoption of computational reverse mathematics over
classical reverse mathematics. In order to provide the relevant motivation, we
could think of this as an instance of naturalistic deferral to mathematical prac-
tice, that is, (3) computable entailment is the right way to measure the strength
of theorems because it better captures the way ordinary mathematicians work
with the objects these theorems concern. In particular, ordinary mathemati-
cians “do not think about (nor care) [. . . ] how much induction is used in any
particular proof” [Shore, 2010, p. 381]. Moreover, definitions and inferences in
informal mathematical practice are not carried out within a fixed formal frame-
work. Working only with ω-models thus reflects ordinary mathematical practice
as, in practice, mathematicians consider the natural numbers to be categorical
and to satisfy induction for all predicates.
5.4 Uncountable reverse mathematics
Since second order arithmetic does not allow quantification over uncountable
sets, classical reverse mathematics is necessarily limited to treating theorems
concerning objects that are either countable, or can be represented by count-
able codes. Computational reverse mathematics offers a way to overcome this
barrier and allow for the development of a reverse mathematics of uncountable
mathematics, by using one of the existing definitions of computation on un-
countable mathematical structures.17 This is done by altering the definition of
computable entailment to quantify not over Turing ideals, but over over classes
of sets that are closed under a different notion of relative computability ap-
propriate to the particular uncountable setting. Shore [2013] takes some initial
steps in this direction by developing a variation of computable entailment that
uses α-recursion theory, along with analogues of ACA and WKL in this setting,
and proving some reverse mathematics-style results for them.
This suggests the following argument. (4a) A framework for reverse mathe-
matics that allows us to analyse the strength of theorems throughout ordinary
mathematics (i.e. not just countable and countably-representable mathemat-
ics) is superior to one that does not. (4b) Computational reverse mathematics
allows us to carry out such an analysis. (4c) Classical reverse mathematics does
17Others have also proposed ways to extend reverse mathematics to the uncountable, most
notably Kohlenbach [2002, 2005] who has developed an approach in higher-order arithmetic.
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not. Therefore, computational reverse mathematics is a superior framework in
which to carry out reverse mathematics.
Little work has been done in this setting beyond Shore’s initial papers, so its
full promise remains as yet unfulfilled. Nevertheless, the adaptability of Shore’s
approach to different settings, with the underlying notion of computation al-
lowed to vary so as to provide an appropriate measure of the computational
strength of theorems in those settings, suggests a highly promising route to a
reverse mathematics of the uncountable. That being said, if a computational
reverse mathematics of the uncountable turns out to be a fruitful approach,
there is no obvious barrier to developing an axiomatic counterpart that stands
in a similar relation to, for example, α-recursion on uncountable ordinals as
RCA0 does to Turing reducibility. So even accepting (4a), the status of (4b) and
(4c) remains unclear. It is therefore difficult to evaluate the extent to which
its extensability to uncountable structures weighs in favour of computational
reverse mathematics.
Intriguingly, Shore [2010] suggests that computational reverse mathematics
of the uncountable will also provide a testing ground for notions of computabil-
ity on uncountable sets, and that (p. 387) “if a theory of computability for
uncountable domains provides a satisfying analysis of mathematical theorems
and constructions in the reverse mathematical sense based on the approach of
[definition 5.1], then it has a strong claim to being a good notion of computation
in the uncountable.” This would result in a virtuous circle of justification. On
the one hand, the success of a notion of computation on uncountable sets in
providing a reverse mathematics of the uncountable would vindicate it as the
correct notion of computation in the uncountable setting. On the other, its
status as the correct notion of computation in the uncountable setting would
support its use as the notion of computation underlying the reverse mathemat-
ics of the uncountable. Alternatively, it may turn out that “there is no single
‘right’ [notion of computation on uncountable sets] but that certain ones may be
better than others for different branches of mathematics” [Shore, 2010, p. 387].
If pursuing computational reverse mathematics could help answer these ques-
tions it would certainly strengthen the case for doing so, but that it might do
so does not provide a prima facie reason for preferring it over classical reverse
mathematics as our general framework for reverse mathematics.
5.5 Closure conditions and the standard view of reverse
mathematics
The standard view in reverse mathematics holds that the significance of reversals
lies in the set existence principles they show to be necessary to prove ordinary
mathematical theorems.18 However, the relevant concept of a set existence
principle, as used in reverse mathematics, has not been explicated in any detail.
Dean and Walsh [2017] have argued that such a concept cannot be exhausted by
the notion of a comprehension principle, since this would leave out weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma and arithmetical transfinite recursion. In [Eastaugh, 2018] I argue that
even if one includes both comprehension principles and separation principles
in the concept of a set existence principle, thereby incorporating all of the Big
Five, there are other mathematically natural set existence principles that are
18The locus classicus of this view is Simpson [2009, p. 2].
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left out, such as weak weak Ko¨nig’s lemma.19
Shore [2010]’s emphasis on the characterisation of the Big Five in terms of
computability-theoretic closure conditions suggests that we could understand
the concept of a set existence principle in terms of that of a closure condition
on the powerset of the natural numbers. I advance a view along these lines in
[Eastaugh, 2018], where I take closure conditions as being axiomatized by those
Π1n sentences (n ≥ 2) that are not equivalent to any less complex sentence.
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This account of set existence principles as closure conditions has a number of
advantages, including its generality, since it not only includes all of the Big
Five and weak weak Ko¨nig’s lemma, but also other statements such as choice
principles and Ramsey-like combinatorial statements. It also has an intuitive
appeal, as attested by a number of authors who have identified set existence
principles with closure conditions, albeit without providing a precise account of
which sentences of second order arithmetic axiomatize closure conditions.21
Despite these appealing characteristics, the details of the account demon-
strate an oddity, namely the status of induction axioms. Instances of the arith-
metical induction scheme Π0∞-IND are at most of Π
1
1 complexity, and thus on
this account are not considered to be set existence principles.22 More complex
fragments of the full induction scheme, however, such as Σ11 induction, will be
axiomatized by Π1n sentences, n ≥ 2, and will not be equivalent to less complex
sentences except by a base theory that proves them outright. They should thus,
according to the view put forward in [Eastaugh, 2018], be considered closure
conditions, and thus set existence principles. This is counterintuitive, since in-
stances of induction are typically taken to concern the structure of the natural
numbers, not the structure of its powerset.
This entanglement between the first and second order parts of the theory
arises because of the existence of non-standard models of arithmetic: the stan-
dard natural numbers ω satisfy not just the full induction scheme Π1∞-IND, but
the induction scheme formulated in any language, no matter how expressively
powerful. Moreover, all finite sets are already present in any model satisfying
recursive comprehension, since finite sets are by definition recursive. It is only
when we consider non-standard models that bounded comprehension schemes
are required to ensure the existence of “finite” sets of size k, where k is a non-
standard number.
Shore’s view offers us a natural response to this problem. Since in computa-
tional reverse mathematics we take the first order part of the model to be fixed
as the standard natural numbers ω, we can rule out instances of induction as
axiomatizing closure conditions, for they will already be satisfied by any base
theory B, as the first order variables of sentences of B will always range over
standard natural numbers. The view that set existence principles are exactly the
closure conditions axiomatized by essentially Π1n≥2 sentences works smoothly in
19The restriction of weak Ko¨nig’s lemma to trees of positive measure.
20Here “equivalent” is to be understood as meaning provably equivalent in any suitable base
theory B that does not prove the sentence in question, but which can otherwise be as strong
as possible. Sentences of this sort are referred to in [Eastaugh, 2018] as essentially Π1
n≥2
sentences; see §5 of that paper for a detailed account of these notions.
21For instance Feferman [1964, p. 8], Feferman [1992, p. 451], Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst,
Mileti, and Shafer [2016, p. 2], and Chong, Slaman, and Yang [2014, p. 864].
22Cf. Simpson [2009, pp. 71–2], who argues that “despite appearances, the Σ01 induction
axiom of RCA0 can be considered to be a set existence axiom”, due to its equivalence to the
scheme of bounded Σ0
1
comprehension.
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Shore’s framework, without counterintuitive instances of induction masquerad-
ing as closure conditions on P(N). Computational reverse mathematics thereby
seems to offer us a better account of the concept of a set existence principle than
classical reverse mathematics, and thus a more satisfactory way of vindicating
the standard view that reversals are significant because they demonstrate the
set existence principles necessary to prove theorems of ordinary mathematics.
6 Preservation of justification under computable
entailment
Computable entailment collapses many distinctions present under the usual clas-
sical entailment relation, and thus the equivalence classes obtained under the
computable equivalence relation are significantly different from those given by
provable equivalence over RCA0. For instance, the standard natural numbers
satisfy the induction scheme for all predicates in the language of second or-
der arithmetic. As a result, systems with only restricted induction and their
counterparts with the full induction scheme are computably equivalent. The
presence of full induction is indicated by the absence of the ‘0’ subscript in the
system’s name: RCA is RCA0 but with full induction, WKL is WKL0 with full
induction, and so on. In all cases, the system with full induction has precisely
the same ω-models as its counterpart with restricted induction, and thus they
are computably equivalent.
This presents a problem given the connections between the Big Five and ex-
isting philosophically-motivated programs in the foundations of mathematics.
At least in some cases these subsystems are formalisations in second order arith-
metic of those foundational programs, but it is by no means obvious that the
same is true for other axiom systems which are computably equivalent to them.
ACA0 is a predicative system, but the mere fact that ACA is computably equiv-
alent to it should not compel us to believe that ACA is similarly predicatively
acceptable.
Another way to understand this point is by considering that a key property
of any entailment relation is preserving justification: if we are justified in ac-
cepting the antecedent then we are justified in accepting the consequent. For
computational reverse mathematics to be capable of the foundational analy-
sis outlined earlier, computable entailment must preserve justification, just as
deductive entailment does. Given any foundational program that we wish to
analyse by proving reverse mathematical results, those results must be justified
on the conception of justification internal to the foundational program itself. If
computable entailment fails to satisfy this requirement then proponents of such
foundational programs will be unmoved by any arguments drawn from com-
putational reverse mathematics, as they will reject the underlying assumption
necessary to proving the results involved. In other words, the crux of the issue
is not whether computable entailment preserves justification on some partic-
ular account of the epistemology of mathematics, but whether it respects the
justificatory structure of the foundational programs being analysed.
In §3 we examined Simpson [1988]’s claim that the proof-theoretic reducibil-
ity ofWKL0 to PRA constitutes a partial realization of Hilbert’s program. There
are reasons to question whether Simpson’s interpretation of Hilbert is correct,
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and plenty of debate to be had over whether this is in fact a good foundation for
mathematics. Nevertheless, the finitistic reductionism that Simpson proposes
is nonetheless a foundational enterprise worthy of consideration. One part of
such an assessment consists of the use of reverse mathematical methods to de-
termine the parts of ordinary mathematics that can be developed within this
foundational framework, that is, foundational analysis as studied in the preced-
ing sections. In order to apply it in this way, our system of reverse mathematics
should therefore be able to analyse Simpson’s finitistic reductionism, and as ar-
gued above, that analysis should respect the justificatory structure of finitistic
reductionism. With this concern in mind, the crucial question is whether or
not finitistic reductionism can be extended from WKL0 to include all systems T
that are computably equivalent to WKL0. Only if this is the case can we con-
clude that Shore’s computational reverse mathematics respects its justificatory
structure.
One system that is computably equivalent to WKL0 is the system WKL. As
mentioned earlier, this system augmentsWKL0 with the full induction scheme. If
computable entailment is to preserve justification for the Tait-style finitist, then
WKL must also be finitistically reducible. But the presence of the full induction
scheme means that, as we shall see below, WKL proves the consistency of PRA.
Therefore, it is not finitistically reducible to PRA, since the canonical formal
consistency statement Con(PRA) is a Π01 statement that PRA does not (if it
is, in fact, consistent) prove. In other words, it rules out the possibility of a
finitistic reduction of the sort delivered by Sieg for WKL0, and thus rules out
the possibility that WKL is a finitistically reducible system.
Recall that IΣn is the fragment of Peano arithmetic obtained by restricting
the induction scheme to Σ0n formulae. The following is a standard result in
the literature on first-order arithmetic. A full proof can be found in Ha´jek and
Pudla´k [1993, §I.4].
Fact 6.1. IΣn+1 proves the consistency of IΣn.
Corollary 6.2.
1. PRA, IΣ1, RCA[0] and WKL[0] are equiconsistent.
2. WKL proves the consistency of the systems given in (1).
3. WKL is not Π01 conservative over the systems given in (1).
Proof. IΣ1 is Π
0
2 conservative over PRA [Parsons, 1970]; the first order part
of RCA0 is IΣ1 (that is, they prove the same sentences in the language L1 of
first order arithmetic); and WKL0 is Π
1
1 conservative over RCA0 (this is a result
of Leo Harrington; a proof appears in Simpson [2009, §IX.2]). Consequently
any Π02 statement provable in WKL0 (or RCA0 or IΣ1) is also provable in PRA.
Since the canonical consistency statements for PRA, IΣ1 and WKL0 are Π
0
1, any
system proving the consistency of one of these systems proves the consistency
of all the others.
By fact 6.1, IΣ2 proves the consistency of IΣ1 and hence the consistency of
all the systems listed in (1). WKL extends IΣ2 and thus proves all the theorems
it does. Finally, by the complexity of consistency statements, WKL cannot be
Π01 conservative over any of the systems listed in (1).
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The methods of infinitary mathematics are justified, according to Simpson’s
finitistic reductionism, only to the extent that they are reducible to finitary
ones. This seems to rule out WKL as a partial realization of Hilbert’s program
quite straightforwardly. But if computable entailment preserves justification,
then we are justified in accepting WKL if and only if we accept WKL0, as they
are computably equivalent. If this is not the case then computable equivalence
seems to have failed as a way to analyse the mathematical resources required to
derive theorems of ordinary mathematics, since it leads to underdetermination:
we are no longer certain, given some theorem ϕ, whether it is acceptable to the
finitistic reductionist if we know only that it is computably entailed by WKL0.
To resolve this underdetermination one could prove that ϕ follows from WKL0
using only resources acceptable to the finitistic reductionist—but since these
resources are simply the axioms of a finitistically reducible system and the laws
of classical logic, this amounts to simply proving the result in WKL0, and we
are no longer working in Shore’s framework, where all that is necessary to show
that one principle follows from another is to demonstrate that the former is true
in every ω-model of the latter.
This being the case, we have at least one situation in which computational
reverse mathematics is not sufficient to carry out a task in reverse mathematics
of significant philosophical interest and importance. The computable entailment
relation does not always preserve the justificatory structure of foundational the-
ories, and hence Shore’s framework thus cannot be used to conduct the kind
of foundational analysis articulated in the previous chapter—at least for one
important example, namely Simpson’s finitistic reductionism.23
In fact, we can show more than this: that computable entailment does not
preserve justification for the two other foundational programs we examined
above: Weyl’s predicativism and the program of predicative reductionism that
follows from the Feferman–Schu¨tte analysis of predicative provability. Here we
rely on a fact that will be demonstrated in lemma 7.5: if ϕ is a Π11 sentence in the
language of second order arithmetic, then ϕ is true if and only if |=c ϕ. We there-
fore have that for any code X for a recursive linear order <X , <X is wellordered
(i.e. X codes a recursive ordinal α) if and only if |=c <X is wellordered. Con-
sider the ordinals ε0 and Γ0, which are respectively the proof-theoretic ordinals
of ACA0 and ATR0. From an external point of view validating that the recursive
codes for these ordinals really do code wellorderings, we have that WO(ε0) and
WO(Γ0). But then by the above fact, |=c WO(ε0) and |=c WO(Γ0). This means
that ACA0 ≡c ACA0 +WO(ε0) and ATR0 ≡c ATR0 +WO(Γ0).
ACA0 does not prove that ε0 is wellordered, but one might reasonably con-
sider WO(ε0) to be a predicative principle nonetheless, since stronger predicative
theories, justified on the Feferman–Schu¨tte analysis of predicativity, do prove
it. However, on that understanding of predicativity, it is not predicatively prov-
able that Γ0 is wellordered. There are therefore theories which are computably
equivalent to predicative and predicative reducible ones but which are not them-
selves either predicative or predicatively reducible. As we have argued above for
the case of finitistic reductionism, this shows that computational reverse math-
23This argument also shows that any modification of reverse mathematics to strengthen the
induction principle of the base theory to include even Σ0
2
induction renders it inappropriate
for the foundational analysis of finitistic reductionism. Friedman’s switch from subsystems of
Z2 with full induction in [Friedman, 1975] to systems with restricted induction in [Friedman,
1976] is therefore a crucial one for the foundational analysis of finitistic reductionism.
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ematics is not an appropriate setting in which to carry out the foundational
analysis of predicativism and predicative reductionism.
One might reasonably wonder whether these latter examples are somehow ar-
tificial and do not constitute substantial counterexamples to the preservation of
justification by the computable entailment relation. Since all true Π11 statements
are computably entailed, this question reduces to the question of whether there
are ordinary mathematical theorems that are Π11 and not justifiable on the basis
of the foundational programs we are considering. The answer to this is positive,
and indeed there are ordinary mathematical theorems equivalent to statements
of the form we have just been considering, namely WO(α) for α < ωCK1 . Simp-
son [1988] showed that Hilbert’s basis theorem is equivalent over RCA0 to the
wellordering of ωω. This is the proof-theoretic ordinal of WKL0, so WO(ω
ω) is
computably entailed by WKL0 but not finitistically reducible, since over a weak
base theory it implies the consistency of WKL0 and thus that of PRA. A much
stronger example is Kruskal’s theorem, a famous result in graph theory that is
equivalent over ACA0 to the wellordering of the small Veblen ordinal ϑΩ
ω [Rath-
jen and Weiermann, 1993, p. 62]. This is a recursive ordinal greater than Γ0,
and thus WO(ϑΩω) is computably entailed by all predicative and predicatively
reducible subsystems of second order arithmetic, but not predicatively provable.
7 The complexity of computable entailment
We now turn to a different but related issue with the computable entailment
relation: its completes-theoretic complexity. As we know from Church and
Turing’s negative answer to the Entscheidungsproblem, the classical provability
relation is uncomputable. Indeed, the set of provable consequences of a theory
like Peano arithmetic is a quintessential example of a recursively enumerable
set that is not recursive. Consequently, while there is no general method for
determining whether or not a sentence ϕ in the language of arithmetic is provable
in RCA0, there is a Turing machine which enumerates the provable consequences
of RCA0, amongst which are the equivalences of classical reverse mathematics.
Semantic relations such as truth tend to be far more complex than syntactic
relations such as provability, since they are—usually ineliminably—infinitary in
nature. The completeness theorem for classical first order logic gives us an im-
portant counterexample: since T |= ϕ ⇔ T ⊢ ϕ for theories T and sentences ϕ,
we can enumerate the model-theoretic consequences of a theory by enumerating
its provable consequences, reducing a complex semantic relation to a finitary
one. The same does not hold for computable entailment. Not only is it not
recursive, but it is not even arithmetical. As a prelude to demonstrating this,
we give a revised definition of computable entailment, generalised to accommo-
date parameters. For the rest of this paper we use the symbol N to refer to the
internal natural numbers of subsystems of second order arithmetic, and reserve
the symbol ω for the external natural numbers of the metatheory.
Definition 7.1. For any setX ⊆ ω, and sentence ϕ in the language L2 expanded
with a constant symbol for X , we say that ϕ is X-computably entailed, in
symbols |=Xc ϕ, iff for all Turing ideals M such that X ∈M , M |= ϕ.
At first glance this may appear less general than the earlier definition, but
by the definition of the satisfaction relation, (ϕ |=Xc ψ) iff |=
X
c (ϕ→ ψ), and the
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new definition is simpler to work with in the current context. Fixing a recursive,
bijective Go¨del coding of sentences of second order arithmetic, we represent the
computable entailment relation by the set of Go¨del codes for sentences which
are computably entailed. For any X ⊆ ω, let
(3) C(X) =
{
pϕq
∣∣ |=Xc ϕ
}
where ϕ is an L2-sentence which may contain a constant X denoting X . The
parameter-free version of C(X) we denote simply C. Observing that the def-
inition of computable entailment quantifies over ω-models, we can see that C
contains all the sentences of True Arithmetic, the first order theory of the nat-
ural numbers. True Arithmetic is not arithmetically definable, as this would
contradict Tarski’s theorem. So computable entailment cannot be arithmetical
either.
A stronger lower bound for the complexity of computable entailment can
be found by noting that arithmetical properties of reals are absolute to all ω-
models, and thus that all Π11 sets of natural numbers are 1-reducible to C. We
can thus precisely characterise its complexity as Π11 complete, by showing that
C can be captured by a Π11 definition. This theorem is essentially a classical
one due to Grzegorczyk, Mostowski, and Ryll-Nardzewski [1958, §3.4, pp. 386–
7]. Their result was proved for the second order functional calculus with the
ω-rule, which they refer to as Aω. We can understand this in the terminology
of the present work as the following result: the set of Go¨del numbers of L2-
sentences true in every ω-model of second order arithmetic Z2 is a Π
1
1 complete
set. The proof presented below is due to Mummert [2012], who proves it for
ω-models of RCA0 rather than full Z2. Relativizing computable entailment to a
set parameter X ⊆ ω we have the following.
Theorem 7.2. For any set parameter X ⊆ ω, the X-computable entailment
relation C(X) is Π11(X) complete.
We shall need some standard definitions from computability theory. For
more background the reader should consult a reference work such as Rogers
[1967] or Soare [1987].
Definition 7.3. For sets X,Y ⊆ ω, X is many-one reducible to Y , X ≤m Y ,
just in case there is a total recursive function f such that for all m ∈ ω,
(4) m ∈ X ⇔ f(m) ∈ Y.
If f is injective then X is 1-reducible to Y , X ≤1 Y , and if f is a bijection then
X and Y are 1-equivalent.
Definition 7.4. Let X ⊆ P(ω). A set X ⊆ ω is complete for X iff X ∈ X and
Y ≤1 X for every Y ∈ X .
Lemma 7.5. For any set parameter X ⊆ ω, every Π11(X) set A is 1-reducible
to C(X).
Proof. Let ϕ(m1, X1) be a Π
1
1 formula. We refer to (ω,P(ω)) as the full model.
Claim: For any n ∈ ω and X ⊆ ω, ϕ(n,X) is true in the full model iff it is
true in all Turing ideals containing X .
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(⇐) The full model is a Turing ideal containing X , so if ϕ(n,X) is false in
the full model then it is false in that ideal.
(⇒) Assume without loss of generality that ϕ(n,X) ≡ ∀Y ψ(n,X, Y ) where
ψ is arithmetical. Suppose there is a Turing ideal C containing X such that
C 6|= ϕ(X). Then there is some counterexample B ∈ C such that C 6|= ψ(X,B).
Since the interpretation of the first order quantifiers and nonlogical symbols are
the same in all ω-models, such a B will remain a counterexample in the full
model.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Given ϕ(m1, X1) as above, let A = { n ∈ ω | ϕ(n,X) }. Define the func-
tion fA : ω → ω as fA(n) = pϕ(n,X)q. This function is recursive and in-
jective, since if a 6= b then pϕ(a,X)q 6= pϕ(b,X)q by the properties of the
Go¨del coding. Finally by the claim above and the fact that ϕ(m1, X1) is Π
1
1,
n ∈ A↔ ϕ(n,X)↔ pϕ(n,X)q = fA(n) ∈ C(X).
Having shown that C is Π11-hard, i.e. that all sets A ∈ Π
1
1 are 1-reducible
to it, we shall show that C is itself Π11 and thus is Π
1
1 complete. In doing
so we shall lean on the following definition which shows how a set can code a
countable Turing ideal. A countable coded ω-model is a set W which codes
countable sequence of sets 〈(W )n | n ∈ N〉 where (W )n = { i | (i, n) ∈W }. For
a full definition of countable coded ω-models see Simpson [2009, §VII.2].
Definition 7.6. Suppose W ⊆ N is a set coding the countable model M and
X ⊆ N. W codes a countable Turing ideal containing X iff
(i) For every m,n, there exists a k such that (W )k = (W )m ⊕ (W )n;
(ii) For every m, if Y ≤T (W )m then there exists a k such that (W )k = Y ;
(iii) There exists some k such that (W )k = X .
Lemma 7.7. Let X,W ⊆ N. The predicate “W codes a countable Turing ideal
containing X” is arithmetical.
Proof. Throughout we use the countable coded ω-modelW as a parameter. The
following formula is an analogue of condition (7.6) of definition 7.6.
(5)
∀m∀n∃k∀x∀y[x ∈ (W )m ∧ y ∈ (W )n
↔ 2x ∈ (W )k ∧ 2y + 1 ∈ (W )k ].
For (7.6), let π(e, n, Y ) be a universal lightface Π01 formula with the given free
variables. The existence of such formulae is provable in RCA[0]; a definition is
provided in Simpson [2009, definition VII.1.3, p. 244]. They play the role of
universal Turing machines.
(6)
∀m∀e0∀e1[ ∀n(π(e0, n, (W )m)↔ ¬π(e1, n, (W )m))
→ ∃k∀n(n ∈ (W )k ↔ π(e0, n, (W )m)) ].
Finally we add condition (7.6) that X is an element of the Turing ideal coded
by W ,
(7) ∃k∀n(n ∈ X ↔ n ∈ (W )k).
One can (tediously) verify that these conditions hold of W if and only if the
ω-model coded by W is a Turing ideal containing X .
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Lemma 7.8. For any set parameter X ⊆ ω, if an L2(X)-sentence ϕ is false
in any Turing ideal containing X, then it is false in a countable Turing ideal
containing X.
Proof. Let M be a Turing ideal containing X , and assume that M |= ¬ϕ. By
the downwards Lo¨wenheim–Skolem theorem, M has a countable ω-submodel
M ′ ⊆ω M such that X ∈M ′. M ′ is a Turing ideal, as this property is definable
by an L2(X) sentence which is true in M , and thus in M
′ by elementarity.
Finally, ϕ is false in M ′, again by elementarity.
Proof of theorem 7.2. Fix a set parameterX . By lemma 7.5, C(X) 1-reduces
every Π11(X) set. It only remains to show that C(X) is itself a Π
1
1(X) set.
Let C†(X) be the set of Go¨del codes of L2-sentences ϕ such that every
countable Turing ideal containing X satisfies ϕ. Lemma 7.8 shows that any
sentence ϕ of second order arithmetic is satisfied by every Turing ideal con-
taining X iff it is satisfied by every countable Turing ideal containing X . So
pϕq ∈ C(X)⇔ pϕq ∈ C†(X). Thus by proving that C†(X) is a Π11(X) set, we
show that C(X) is also Π11(X).
The relation pϕq ∈ C†(X) can be defined in second order arithmetic as:
(8) (∀ countable Turing ideals M)(X ∈M →M |= ϕ)
By lemma 7.7, the predicate “W codes a countable Turing ideal M” is arith-
metical. M |= ϕ means “There exists a satisfaction function f for M such that
f(pϕq) = 1.” Although this is Σ11, every such f is provably unique, and thus
M |= ϕ is equivalent to a Π11 formula. 
Computable entailment thus transcends arithmetical truth, being recursively
isomorphic to the Π11 theory of the natural numbers, and also to membership
in Kleene’s O, the set of notations for recursive ordinals. Nevertheless its com-
plexity is towards the lower end of the logics considered by Va¨a¨na¨nen [2001] and
Koellner [2010], being for instance far less complex than the full second-order
consequence relation. But as we shall soon see, such complexity is incompatible
with the requirements of foundational analysis.
The Entscheidungsproblem was considered by Hilbert and others to be of
such importance because a positive solution would have meant we could obtain,
by finite means, knowledge of the provability or unprovability of all mathemat-
ical statements. The computational intractability of the classical provability
relation constitutes an epistemic difficulty for mathematics. From this perspec-
tive, we should be troubled by an entailment relation such as Shore’s with a far
greater degree of uncomputability.
It’s well known that truth definitions are not simple: Kripke’s fixed-point
construction of a truth predicate over the natural numbers is also Π11 complete
[Kripke, 1975]. Provability, at least for classical first-order logic, is compara-
tively uncomplicated. If RCA0 |= ϕ then we can produce a finitary proof witness
by an exhaustive search. We have no such assurance when |=c ϕ: computable
entailment does not satisfy Go¨del’s completeness theorem, so we are unable
to reduce this complex semantic relation to the more finitistically acceptable
provability relation.
ω-logic does have a completeness theorem of sorts, namely the ω-complete-
ness theorem of Henkin and Orey, as mentioned in §5. By this theorem, restrict-
ing to ω-models is equivalent to closing one’s consequence set under the ω-rule.
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This is typically formalised in terms of an infinitary proof calculus, where proofs
are well-founded trees which branch infinitely on uses of the ω-rule. However,
this completeness theorem does not induce a reduction in the complexity of the
computable entailment relation: computable entailment is irredeemably infini-
tary. Computable entailment is also impredicative. Shore’s definition quantifies
over all Turing ideals, and while theorem 7.2 shows that a definition quantifying
only over countable Turing ideals is in fact equivalent to Shore’s, computable
entailment is still Π11 complete, and thus an archetypal impredicative relation.
While determining the complexity of the computable entailment relation in
a traditional, computability-theoretic way as we have above is a useful classi-
fication exercise, it comes with some disadvantages. Principally, it does not
make clear what proof-theoretic resources are required in order to prove the
result. This means that it is unclear whether the result is epistemically acces-
sible to the convinced F -theorist, where F is a given foundational approach
such as those studied in §3 and §4. From an external viewpoint we can see that
the computable entailment relation is definable in the language of second order
arithmetic, by quantifying over all countable Turing ideals. We therefore turn
to the resources of reverse mathematics and show that an analogue of theorem
7.2 can be proved within a predicative subsystem of second order arithmetic.
To do so we must select the correct base theory, and then formulate the
principle that truth sets for the X-computable entailment relations exist with
some care. The first barrier is that RCA0 does not prove that codes for countable
Turing ideals exist. Nor, given a countable coded Turing ideal M , does it prove
that the satisfaction function f for M exists. We therefore work in the stronger
theory ACA0. However, ACA0 does not prove that the full satisfaction function
for any countable coded Turing ideal (considered as an ω-model) exists, since
such a satisfaction function is essentially a truth predicate for the first-order
language of arithmetic, and thus not arithmetically definable. We therefore
formulate the definition of the truth set for X-computable entailment C(X)
in a slightly modified form, using not full satisfaction functions but valuation
functions for single sentences.24 For details of the notion of a valuation function
see definition VII.2.1 of Simpson [2009].
Definition 7.9. The following definition is made in ACA0. Let X ⊆ N be any
set and let pϕq be a Go¨del code for a sentence ϕ in the language of second
order arithmetic L2 extended with a constant symbol for X . We say that ϕ is
X-computably entailed, pϕq ∈ C(X), if for every code W for a countable Turing
ideal M such that X ∈ M , and for every valuation function f : SubM (ϕ) →
{ 0, 1 }, we have that f(pϕq) = 1.
Lemma 7.10. Suppose ϕ(m,X) is a Π11 formula with exactly the displayed free
variables. Then the following is provable in ACA0. For all X ⊆ N, if C(X)
exists, then Y = {m | ϕ(m,X) } exists and Y ≤T C(X).
Proof. Let ϕ(m,X) be as above. By the Kleene normal form theorem for Π11 for-
mulas, there is a Σ01 formula σ(m, f,X) with exactly the displayed free variables
24This definition is extensionally equivalent to the previous one using full satisfaction func-
tions, as can be seen from the viewpoint of proof-theoretically stronger but still predicatively
reducible theories such as ACA+
0
, which prove that satisfaction functions for countable coded
ω-models exist. Dorais [2012] explains many of the subtleties involved.
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such that ACA0 proves
∀m∀X(ϕ(m,X)↔ ∀fσ(m, f,X)).
Given m ∈ N and X ⊆ N, we reason in ACA0 and show that
∀fσ(m, f,X)↔ p∀fσ(m, f,X)q ∈ C(X).
(⇒) Suppose p∀fσ(m, f,X)q 6∈ C(X). Then there exists a code W1 for a
countable Turing idealM1 containingX , and a valuation function g1 : SubM1(ψ1)→
{ 0, 1 } (where ψ1 ≡ ∀fσ(m, f,X)), such that g1(ψ1) = 0. By the definition of
the valuation function, there exists k ∈ N which is the index of a function
f1 = (W )k, such that g1(pσ(m, f1, X)q) = 0. f1 exists by recursive com-
prehension in the parameter W , and since arithmetical formulas are absolute
between the ambient model and any countable coded ω-model, we have that
¬σ(m, f1, X), and so ¬∀fσ(m, f,X).
(⇐) Suppose there exists f2 such that ¬σ(m, f2, X). By arithmetical com-
prehension there exists a code W2 for a countable Turing ideal M2 such that
X, f2 ∈ M2 (for example, just take the code for the ideal consisting of the sets
recursive in X ⊕ f2). Arithmetical comprehension also proves the existence
of a valuation function g2 : SubM2(ψ2) → { 0, 1 }, where ψ2 ≡ ¬σ(m, f2, X) ∧
∀fσ(m, f,X). By absoluteness, g2(p¬σ(m, f2, X)q) = 1, so g2(p∀fσ(m, f,X)q) =
0, and hence p∀fσ(m, f,X)q 6∈ C(X).
Given a set X ⊆ N, assume that C(X) exists. Let Y be the set of all m
such that p∀fσ(m, f,X)q ∈ C(X). Y is recursive in C(X), and thus exists
by recursive comprehension. So by the equivalence just proved, ∀m(m ∈ Y ↔
ϕ(m,X)).
While this result demonstrates that the complexity of the computable en-
tailment relationship is in some sense accessible to the predicativist, if not the
finitistic reductionist, it is not clear what the philosophical moral should be. A
natural interpretation might be that a Π11 complete entailment relation such as
computable entailment is much more uncomputable than the relation of prov-
ability in classical logic, and that this degree of uncomputability can be com-
prehended from within a predicativist formal theory. This conclusion goes hand
in hand with a more general view that the Turing degrees track a hierarchy of
relative difficulty of problem solving: problems with higher Turing degree are
harder to solve than those with lower Turing degree.
This is related to the na¨ıve reading of the intuition discussed in §5.2 that
“being harder to prove” means “harder to compute”, and is an unsatisfying
interpretation for similar reasons. The first concerns the use of the computable
entailment relation. We are not seeking a general method that for any ϕ, ψ in
the language of second order arithmetic tells us whether or not ϕ |=c ψ. Rather,
given specific statements of mathematical interest, we try to prove (or disprove)
that one computably entails the other. The proofs involved here are typical
mathematical proofs, carried out in the usual way, not infinitary inferences: they
quantify over Turing ideals, but they do not require that we are able, as mathe-
maticians, to solve the halting problem or determine membership in Kleene’s O.
Secondly, it is unclear why—given that they are both uncomputable—that the
computable entailment relation is epistemically any more intractable than the
standard first order provability relation of classical logic. Absent the ability to
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carry out supertasks, we cannot solve the halting problem, so even in principle,
determining for arbitrary ϕ, ψ whether or not RCA0 ⊢ ϕ → ψ seems as out of
reach as determining whether ϕ |=c ψ.
Given this, a more plausible reconstruction of mathematical practice when
we prove computable entailments or failures of computable entailment is that
we work in a way that can be formalised in a standard deductive calculus, but
that in doing so we assume that quantifying over all Turing ideals (or equiv-
alently, over all countable Turing ideals) is well-defined. One way of ensuring
this well-definedness is to work in a background theory that proves that the ex-
tension of the computable entailment relation exists. In this context, knowing
the precise Turing degree of the computable entailment relation takes on greater
significance, since it allows us to determine what axioms are both necessary and
sufficient to prove its well-definedness.
Corollary 7.11. The following are equivalent over ACA0.
1. Π11 comprehension.
2. For every X ⊆ N, the truth set C(X) of the X-computable entailment
relation exists.
Proof. The definition of C(X) is Π11, as can be seen from definition 7.9, so Π
1
1
comprehension proves that for any X ⊆ N, C(X) exists.
For the reversal we work in ACA0. Let ϕ(m) be a Π
1
1 formula. Using pairing,
join all n free set variables in ϕ(m), to produce an equivalent formula ϕ′(m,Y )
with a single free set variable Y , such that ACA0 proves
∀X1 . . . ∀Xn∀Y ∀m(ϕ(m)↔ ϕ
′(m,Y )).
Given Y , assume that C(X) exists. Lemma 7.10 applied to ϕ′(m,Y ), together
with the above equivalence, implies the existence of a set Z such that ∀m(m ∈
Z ↔ ϕ(m)). This proves Π11 comprehension.
Π11-CA0 is the strongest of the subsystems of second order arithmetic usually
studied in reverse mathematics. Computational reverse mathematics therefore
draws on resources which are unavailable in the four members of the Big Five
that are proof-theoretically weaker than Π11-CA0. Moreover, since 7.11 is prov-
able within a predicative system, the predicativist is in a position to calibrate
the strength of the commitment involved in accepting computable entailment.
Doing so, she will see that not only is it stronger than predicative systems like
ACA0, but also predicatively reducible ones like ATR0. So not only does the
existence of the truth set for the computable entailment relation exceed the
strength of the predicativist and the predicative reductionist’s theoretical re-
sources, but they are in a position to see that it does. Since they reject impred-
icative mathematics, and thus reject Π11 comprehension, they must therefore
reject the equivalent statement that the truth set for computable entailment
exists.
For foundational analysis to be a useful and worthwhile endeavour within the
philosophy of mathematics, the fruits of its analysis must be epistemically avail-
able to disputants. Recall our example of Sarah the predicativist from §2. Since
she accepts ACA0, she believes that the equivalence between Π
1
1 comprehen-
sion and the statement (⋆), “Every countable abelian group can be expressed
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as a direct sum of a divisible group and a reduced group” is true, since it is
provable in a system contained in ACA0 (namely RCA0). How she responds to
Rebecca’s challenge that Sarah’s predicativism is misguided, since it does not
allow her to prove the ordinary mathematical theorem (⋆), will depend on the
details of her views about the foundations of mathematics, but she cannot dis-
miss the equivalence as question-begging. On the other hand, suppose Rebecca
were instead to present Sarah with the following argument: Π11-CA0 and (⋆) are
computably equivalent, that is to say they are true in exactly the same Turing
ideals. Sarah should therefore accept Π11-CA0, since (⋆) is an ordinary mathe-
matical theorem that any reasonable foundational system should prove. In this
case Sarah can resist the conclusion by refusing to accept the antecedent: com-
putable equivalence is not a well-defined notion, since it presupposes theoretical
resources which predicativism denies. Any argument presupposing that com-
putable equivalence is a well-defined notion therefore begs the question against
her position.
We argued in §2 that philosophical arguments that attempts to invoke re-
verse mathematical results in foundational analysis should, if they are to have
any force, appeal only to principles that targets of these argument already ac-
cept. In other words, its presuppositions must not exceed their theoretical com-
mitments. But the argument above shows that the theoretical commitments
which accompany the use of computable entailment outstrip those acceptable
to partisans of most of the foundational programs associated with subsystems
of second order arithmetic. Computational reverse mathematics does not allow
one, in general, to persuasively demonstrate the mathematical limits of these
foundational programs to those who accept them.
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